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Abstract 
Energy security and climate change are prime political concerns in the European 
Union. The main instrument to combat climate change through reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions in the EU is the EUETS, a cap and trade system. This 
thesis investigates in a case study the question of how the EUETS potentially 
impacts European energy security. In order to analyze potential impacts, this 
study operationalizes theories of institutional interaction and of energy security. 
Using a literature review method, the energy security impacts of the five main 
climate mitigation options that operators under the EUETS have, are analyzed: 
switch to natural gas, switch to renewables, switch to nuclear, energy efficiency 
improvements and carbon capture. The analysis shows that the potential impact on 
European energy security is different for each option. The EUETS as a whole 
therefore has a potentially mixed impact on energy security. More research is 
needed in order to assess the actual rather than only the potential impacts of the 
EUETS on energy security. For such research to be feasible, governments must 
begin to collect and publish data on emissions abatement under the EUETS, so 
that researchers can observe what operators actually do to reduce their emissions. 
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  1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
Climate change is often described as one of the most severe threats that mankind 
has ever faced, and at the same time one of the most difficult ones to defuse 
(Munasinghe & Swart, 2005:3, 208; Greenpeace, 2013). It is caused by the release 
of greenhouse gases (GHG) into the atmosphere, a ubiquitous occurrence in 
today’s technological civilization (ibid:14). In 1992 the signatory countries of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed 
that the most developed countries have a special responsibility to stop climate 
change because they have emitted GHGs for the longest time, because their per 
capita emissions are among the highest in the world, and because they have the 
biggest capacity to mitigate (“Principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities” UNFCCC, 1992, Art. 3§1, Art.4§2). The scientific research 
synthesized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 
international scientific body tasked with compiling research on climate change, 
estimates that in order for climate change not to become catastrophic, world GHG 
emissions need to be reduced by 50% - 80% by the year 2050 compared to 1990 
levels (IPCC, 2007:197).  
Because of the special responsibility of developed countries to mitigate 
climate change stated in Art. 3§1 UNFCCC, it is necessary that the EU and other 
highly developed countries and regions1 reduce their respective emissions by 80% 
- 95%  by 2050 in order to reach the overall world-wide emissions reductions goal 
of 50% - 80% (IPCC, 2007:776). In 2009 the EU took a bold first step by 
adopting the climate and energy package (CEP), which includes a binding 
commitment to reduce GHG emissions by 20% by the year 2020 and to increase 
the reduction to 30% if other developed countries followed (Egenhofer&Alessi, 
2013:2). The EUETS (European Union Emissions Trading System) is the flagship 
instrument of the CEP, it covers some 11 000 large industrial installations and 
power plants, which produce ca. 45% of all European GHG emissions (European 
Commission, 2013e:2-4). It is a market-based instrument that issues emission 
permits every year for the amount of GHGs that can be safely released into the 
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atmosphere, which the installations covered by the EUETS directive 
(2009/29/EC) must purchase at auctions in order to be able to emit2 (ibid). The 
EUETS promises to reduce emissions at the lowest possible cost thanks to 
efficient allocation by market mechanisms. It also provides flexibility to 
individual installations, which can decide individually whether to reduce 
emissions (abate) or rather buy permits and emit, and if they abate the choice of 
how to abate and of how much is also left to them. While being designed with a 
focus on flexibility and economic efficiency, the effects of the EUETS on 
European energy security (EES) are less well-known and understood. 
Energy security (ES) is a large and growing concern for Europe, mainly 
because of Europe’s dependence on imported energy (European Commission, 
2010:2-5). In 2010, the EU needed to import 52,7% of all the energy it consumes 
from outside the Union, mostly in the form of coal, oil, and gas (Eurostat, 
2012:29). The rise of energy prices to unprecedented levels during the first decade 
of the 21st century (ibid) as well as several interruptions of gas deliveries from 
Russia to Europe in the middle of the winter (Pirani et al., 2009:19), firmly 
established the issue of ES on the agenda of politicians and in public perception 
alike (Smith-Stegen, 2011:6506). Reflecting the rise in importance of ES, starting 
in the year 2000, the European Commission published a series of green papers, 
communications and other policy documents (cf. Checchi et al, 2009:5; European 
Commission, 2000), culminating in the inclusion of energy security as a goal for 
European energy policy in the treaty of Lisbon (Art. 194§1(b) TFEU). Many 
consider energy security as well as climate policy as some of the most important 
and prioritized issues in EU policy today and for a long time to come (Langsdorf, 
2011:2).  
The link between the EUETS and EES are fossil fuels (IEA, 2007:28). When 
fossil fuels are burned, CO2, which is a GHG, is emitted into the atmosphere and 
contributes to climate change (Munasinghe & Swart, 2005:14). What makes the 
overlap especially salient is the fact that CO2 emissions from the combustion of 
fossil fuels make up 77% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions and CO2 is thus 
the most important radiative forcing agent causing climate change (IPCC, 
2007:103). At the same time, fossil fuels are also by far the most important energy 
source of the EU, representing 77% of gross inland energy consumption3 of the 
EU-27 in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012:40). Climate policies directly or indirectly 
influence fuel choices away from high-carbon and towards low-carbon or no-
carbon energy sources (IEA, 2007:38). This is also the case for the EUETS, which 
puts a price on carbon, i.e. an economic disincentive to use carbon-rich fuels and 
thus abate emissions. Abatement, i.e. technology applied or measures taken to 
reduce emissions (Thampapillai, 2002:113), almost always causes changes in 
fossil fuel consumption. As a result of abatement either less fossil fuels are 
consumed because abatement activities mean more efficient equipment is used, or 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2 A more detailed description of the EUETS is given in chapter 2. 
3 Gross Inland Energy Consumption is a comprehensive statistical measure for energy consumption. 2010 is the 
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fuel is changed for less carbon-intense sources. Both types of change are assumed 
to have an impact on ES (IEA, 2007:91). 
The EUETS sector consists of large installations like power plants or large 
industrial plants and emits 45% of all GHG emissions in the EU (European 
Commission, 2013b). The share of EUETS emissions that originate from the 
combustion of fossil fuels is 73% (EEA, 2013:21). Most of these emissions come 
from electricity generation in fossil fuel power plants and from industrial and 
district heating plants4 (ibid:30).  
1.2 Research Problem  
In climate and energy policy circles, there is an ongoing debate about the 
relationship between climate policies and energy security (cf. Sovacool, 2010:44-
46; Checchi et al, 2009:42; Turton&Barreto, 2006:2246-2248). Some authors, 
especially those advocating climate mitigation policies, argue that climate 
mitigation policies such as the EUETS are improving European energy security 
(EES) because they reduce the reliance on imported fossil fuels (cf. McCollum et 
al., 2013:486-488; IPCC, 2014b:45). Other authors argue that climate mitigation 
policies make energy more expensive because they make cheap and plentiful 
domestic coal unusable (cf. Adelle et al., 2009:42-44; Checchi et al. 2009:42) and 
that the purported benefits for EES are less than certain (Luft et al. in Sovacool, 
2010:48-51). These claims are usually based on some improvised arguments 
rather than being based on a comprehensive analysis of the EUETS. Several 
analyses of the EUETS economic and environmental impact have been published 
(European Commission, 2008b), but no dedicated analysis of the EES impacts of 
the EUETS could be found in the literature search for this study. A report jointly 
published by FRIDE, a Spanish think tank and Egmont, the Royal Belgian 
Foreign policy think tank, highlights the same point: “This author found no 
comprehensive study of the current or potential net impact of the ETS on 
European energy security” (Gault, 2007:3). Adelle et al. (2009:16) also identify a 
clear need “ [...] to more widely examine the possible synergies and trade-offs 
between climate and energy policy”. Also Martin et al. (2012:46) identify a clear 
research gap on the question of how the EUETS interacts with existing policies 
and policy goals. Both climate mitigation and ES are important and overlapping 
European policy concerns, whose importance is expected only to increase in the 
future (Langsdorf, 2011:2). There is a chance that the EUETS will affect the 
achievement of EES, but at this point we do not have a clear picture of how it may 
do so, whether the impact will be positive or negative, or if there is going to be a 
noticeable impact at all.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4 i.e. “combustion installations” in the language of the EUETS directive (2009/29/EC:85) 
  4 
Because of the great importance of both climate mitigation policy and energy 
security for the EU, as well as the perceived research gap about the nature of the 
relationship between the two policies, I propose the following research question: 
 
How does the EU ETS potentially affect European energy security? 
 
Sub-question:  
How do the different abatement options available to operators under the 
EUETS potentially influence European energy security?  
 
In order to answer the research question I conduct an exploratory qualitative case 
study, where the potential impacts of the EUETS on EES are treated as cases of 
institutional interaction. To find out what kind of effect the different abatement 
options potentially have on EES I propose to structure the thesis in the following 
way: 
 In chapter two the policy context of the EUETS and of European energy 
security, i.e. European climate policy and European energy policy, is introduced. 
This overview of the policy context shall enable the reader to better understand 
and place in its context the more specific analysis of ES impacts, which is 
performed in chapter five. Also in chapter two, in section 2.1.3, the five climate 
mitigation options compiled by the IPCC are identified as the aspect (outcomes) 
of the EUETS most likely to affect EES, and which are therefore specifically 
mentioned in the sub-question.  
In order to conceptualize how one policy such as the EUETS may influence or 
affect another policy or policy goal such as EES, the framework of institutional 
interaction, developed by Oberthür&Gehring (2006), is discussed and 
operationalized in chapter three. The framework of institutional interaction also 
provides a way to categorize the impacts that the EUETS potentially has on EES.  
In order to assess what kind of impact an abatement category may have on ES, 
a sufficiently operational definition of ES is needed. In the second part of chapter 
three, ES is defined as a function of availability, accessibility and reliability of 
energy supplies, and arguments are presented for why this specific 
conceptualization is chosen. The methodological challenges of analyzing 
institutional interaction through a literature review method are discussed in 
chapter four. 
In chapter five the analysis of how each abatement category may influence 
EES is performed. First, a description of how each abatement category works, 
how it achieves climate mitigation, is provided. This is directly followed by an 
analysis of the potential impacts of the respective abatement option on EES based 
on a literature review of existing scientific studies and grey literature. 
Why are we investigating potential rather than actual effects? Because data 
availability on actual abatement under the EUETS is poor5. Data on abatement is 
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not collected by governments under the EUETS (Martin et al., 2012:43), and 
therefore this study focuses on what operators under the EUETS potentially can 
do to reduce their emissions rather than on what they actually do. 
This study focuses on the EUETS as it is in force at the time of writing. This 
means the rules, which entered into force at the beginning of the third trading 
period on the 1st of January 2013.  
 
 
  6 
2 Policy Context 
The overview of the policy fields given in this chapter shall enable the reader to 
put the more specific analysis of ES impacts performed in chapter five, into the 
broader climate and energy policy context, and thus make it accessible and 
meaningful. The development, theory and functioning in practice of the EUETS 
as well as an overview of the ES situation and policy in place in the EU are 
therefore briefly introduced in this chapter.  
2.1 The EUETS 
2.1.1 Development of the EUETS 
During the course of the 1990s European politicians became increasingly aware of 
climate change (Wråke et al, 2012:12). The understanding that total global 
emissions need to be reduced in order to avert catastrophic climate change, lead to 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC (Oberthür & Roche Kelly, 2008:36). 
The EU and its then 15 member states acted as leaders of the international climate 
negotiations, urging developed countries to commit to binding emissions cuts, and 
accepting to make the deepest emissions cuts of all countries6 themselves (ibid).  
After a period of relatively high ambition but little concrete action, the Kyoto 
protocol commitments, which required the EU to show “demonstrable progress” 
by 2005 towards achieving their 2012 emissions reduction target of 8%, forced 
the EU into action (Wråke et al, 2012:13). The joint fulfillment option allowed the 
EU to pool their emissions reductions, as long as the total would be 8% compared 
to base year levels, which opened the door for Europe-wide measures to achieve 
emissions reductions (UNFCCC, 1998, Art. 3). Initially a European tax on 
emissions was considered as a policy instrument by the Commission, but ran into 
resistance from member states and the unanimity requirement for matters 
concerning taxation7 (Wråke et al, 2012:12; Oberthür & Roche Kelly, 2008:39). 
An emissions trading system on the other hand was considered environmental 
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Annex B) 
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Art. 113 TFEU (Lisbon treaty, EU, 2010)  
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policy and therefore subject to qualified majority voting rules in the council8 
(Wråke et al, 2012:12). Furthermore, “flexible mechanisms” such as an ETS were 
specifically included in the Kyoto Protocol and therefore likely to be regarded as 
“demonstrable progress” towards achieving the required GHG reductions by the 
UNFCCC (ibid). The EUETS came thus into being after the council adopted 
directive 2003/87/EC in 2003. The development of the EUETS took place in three 
phases or trading periods: phase 1 (2005-2007), phase 2 (2008-2012) and phase 3 
(2013-2020). Phase one was the pilot phase, it was meant to achieve political buy-
in with the participating countries and to generate experience in the operation of 
the system (Wråke et al, 2012:13). Importantly, phase one and two had national 
allocation plans (NAP), which allowed national governments to allocate 
allowances to important industries in their respective countries for free. 
The provisions from the “new” EUETS directive (2009/29/EC) that entered 
into force at the start of the third trading period on January 1st 2013, introduced 
auctioning as the main method of allocation, and a single European-wide cap 
(limit) determined by the Commission rather than the NAPs (Wråke et al, 
2012:19). Already in 2013 more than 40% of allowances are auctioned. 
Auctioning will progressively increase to 100%, at the latest by 2027 (European 
Commission, 2013f). Those allowances still being allocated for free, are allocated 
according to precise, uniformly applicable rules, chiefly to operators on the 
carbon leakage list, i.e. installations that are particularly vulnerable to price 
competition from GHG-intensive products originating in non-ETS countries 
(Article 10b, Directive 2009/29/EC). Auctioning is important as theorists consider 
auctioning the economically efficient and fair method of permit allocation (Asafu-
Adjaye, 2005:86). 
In April 2009 the EU adopted the “Climate and Energy Package” (CEP), 
which consists of four principal legislative elements: the “renewables directive”9, 
the “effort sharing decision”10, the “new EUETS directive”11, and the “CCS 
directive”12. Energy efficiency, which is also considered an important part of EU 
climate policy, was only addressed by a directive13 in 2012, with energy 
efficiency targets not binding on MS. The CEP is most well-known for its 20-20-
20 targets: 20% emissions reductions (binding), 20% renewable energy sources as 
share of primary energy consumption (binding), 20% reduction of primary energy 
consumption (non-binding), all three to be achieved by the year 2020 
(Egenhofer&Alessi, 2013:2; European Commission, 2013a).  
Boasson & Wettestad (2013:43-50) assess that the EU was eager to 
demonstrate climate policy leadership ahead of the COP 15 meeting in 
Copenhagen in 2009, where it wanted to produce successor agreement to the 
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9 Directive 2009/28/EC “renewables directive” 
10 Decision 406/2009/EC “effort sharing decision” 
11 Directive 2009/29/EC “new EUETS directive” 
12 Directive 2009/31/EC “CCS directive” 
13 Directive 2012/27/EU “Energy Efficiency Directive” 
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Kyoto Protocol. It was thought that adopting a strong climate policy unilaterally 
would give the EU credibility and leverage at the negotiating table (ibid). 
2.1.2 Functioning of the EUETS 
The EUETS is today (2013) the centerpiece of EU climate mitigation policy and 
covers around 45% of all GHG emissions in the EU, which it reduces by more 
than 21% by the year 2020 compared to 2005 levels (European Commission, 
2013b). It is a truly European policy as it is uniformly and equally applied to all 
operators that are included in the EUETS, regardless of MS (ibid; Wettestad et al., 
2012:75). Under the EUETS one ton of CO2 emissions or its equivalent in other 
GHGs (tCO2e) equals one allowance (EUA). One tCO2e contributes to global 
warming by the same amount, regardless by whom or where14 it is emitted. 
Allowances (EUAs) are issued by the EU, and the number of EUAs issued 
annually is determined by the cap15. The cap is another word for the total amount 
of allowances issued during one year, and thus constitutes an absolute limit on 
how many tCO2e can be emitted by all operators together under the EUETS in one 
year16 (European Commission, 2013c). It is calculated by taking into 
consideration the historical emissions of the installations covered by the EUETS 
directive (2009/29/EC, Art. 9) and the reduction needed to reach the 21% 
reduction target by 2020 in a linear fashion. After 2013, the cap is reduced every 
year by the same amount17. The idea behind this linear reduction factor is to 
eliminate the political wrangling that had previously surrounded the setting of the 
cap, and thus to reduce the impact of political uncertainty on EUA prices 
(European Commission, 2008a:90-95). Because the cap and its future reductions 
are known for the entire third trading period, carbon prices are expected to 
fluctuate less, which should allow participants of the EUETS to better plan their 
abatement (ibid). Operators of installations covered by the EUETS must surrender 
one allowance for each tCO2e they emit. An operator may receive EUAs as free 
allocation or in an auction from the EU, or from trade with firms who sell their 
surplus allowances because it is cheaper for them to abate and sell then to emit. If 
operators do not surrender enough allowances to cover all their emissions, they 
are fined 100€/tCO2e unlawfully emitted18, and have to buy EUAs for the shortfall 
(European Commission, 2013e:4).  
Only large installations are covered by the ETS directive, so that small 
emitters of GHG are not confronted with an undue administrative or financial 
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16 For 2013, the first year with a European-wide cap, the number of allowances issued is just under 2.08 billion 
(European Commission, 2013c). 
17 Linear reduction factor of 37,435,387 allowances, 1.74% of the 2008-2012 average total cap (European 
Commission, 2013c). 
18 Compare the 100€/ton fine in 2013 to the current market price of ca. 5€/EUA 
(http://www.investing.com/commodities/carbon-emissions) 
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burden. The thresholds for participation are laid out in the EUETS directive 
(2009/29/EC, Annex 1).  
In order for the carbon market to 
work, the number of allowances issued 
must be inferior to the amount of GHGs 
that all installations under the EUETS 
combined would emit without any 
policy in place19, thus creating scarcity. 
Because EUAs are scarce, and because 
they are tradable on different markets, 
the demand by operators for EUAs sets a 
price for the EUA. In theory the price 
for an EUA equals the aggregate 
marginal cost of abatement 
(Thampapillai, 2002:119; Perman, 
2011:204). Through the operation of an 
ETS, those operators for whom it is the 
cheapest to reduce emissions will abate 
more and, and those for whom it is more 
expensive to do so will instead buy 
permits rather than all being forced to 
abate by the same amount (cf. Pearce & 
Turner, 1990:112; Thampapillai, 
2002:119; Perman, 2011:204), thus 
reducing emissions in the most cost-efficient way (European Commission, 
2013e:5). What is important for averting catastrophic climate change, is reaching 
the aggregate reductions targets, i.e. reducing the total amount of GHG emissions, 
not that every operator reduces them by the same amount (gov.uk, 2013:2).  
The carbon price signal is supposed to guide investment decisions of 
companies into abatement technologies. Cap and trade belongs to a class of 
environmental policies called market-based instruments (MBI), which use price or 
some other economic variable to incentivize polluters/economic agents to abate 
pollution, and thus internalize an externality (Asafu-Adjaye, 2005:86; Saunier & 
Meganck, 2007:185). The economic/policy motivation behind creating a cap and 
trade mechanism is to internalize a negative externality, e.g. the GHG emissions 
causing climate change, and thereby remedying a market failure. When permits 
(EUAs) are auctioned in the EUETS, the “polluter pays principle” (PPP) is put in 
practice (European Commission, 2013e:3).  The PPP proposes that externalities 
are internalized at the point where they occur, i.e. by the polluter, thus correcting 
the market failure in the most accurate way (Asafu-Adjaye, 2005:86). It basically 
means that: “... polluters should pay for pollution prevention and control measures 
as well as for the environmental damage they cause and that the government 
should not subsidize pollution” (Woerdman et al, 2008:572).  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
19 This is often referred to as BAU - business as usual scenario 
 
Figure 1. Functioning of the EUETS 
Source: Energieagentur NRW (2013:3)  
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Compliance is ensured through the monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV) cycle, where operators must continuously monitor their emissions, draw 
up annual emissions reports, have them verified by an accredited verifier, and 
submit them for further inspection to the competent national authority (European 
Commission, 2013d). When the MRV cycle is completed, the surrendered 
allowances are obliterated in the single EU registry. The MRV cycle ensures, that 
every emission of GHG by every operator is accounted for. It forms the backbone 
of the EUETS. Only if there is no way to “cheat” i.e. to emit GHGs without 
anybody noticing, can there be scarcity in the market for EUAs so that they 
achieve a market value (Brunner et al, 2009:13).  
Extending today’s linear reduction factor of the EUETS of 1,74% all the way 
to 2050, it can be calculated, that the resulting emissions reductions amount to 
only about 70% reductions compared to 1990-levels (European Commission, 
2012:8), far short of the long-term goal of 80% - 95% emissions reductions which 
EU MS have pledged in the October 2009 Council conclusions (European 
Council, 2009:3), which are re-confirmed in the energy roadmap 2050 (European 
Commission, 2011:3) and were originally laid out in the fourth assessment report 
of the IPCC (2007:776). The cap is thus set at a sub-optimal level and unless it is 
tightened in the future, the EUETS is actually not effective in preventing 
catastrophic climate change because it does not produce the required emissions 
reductions. 
2.1.3 Abatement 
In environmental economics the term abatement or pollution abatement is often 
used (cf. Thampapillai, 2002:113). Pollution abatement is defined by the OECD 
as “... technology applied or measure taken to reduce pollution and/or its impacts 
on the environment.” (OECD, 2014). Only emissions reductions that are the result 
of specific efforts to reduce emissions, and not emissions reductions that are 
caused by other random occurrences like for example an economic crisis, can be 
counted as abatement (Venmans, 2012:5496). In the case of the EUETS, the 
pollution that is to be abated is the emission of GHG into the atmosphere 
(Munasinghe & Swart, 2005:14). As we know from the introduction, the emission 
of GHG is a special kind of pollution because it causes anthropogenic climate 
change (ibid). The international scientific body charged with the study of climate 
change, the IPCC has devised a terminology that is widely followed in the field, 
using the term “mitigation” to denote “...the effort to control the human sources of 
climate change and their cumulative impacts, notably the emission of GHGs and 
other pollutants, such as black carbon particles, that also affect the planet’s energy 
balance.” (IPCC, 2014a:6).  
While the term abatement is obviously broader than the term mitigation 
because it is also concerned with reducing other kinds of pollution than GHG 
emissions, it is also more concrete. It speaks of concrete technical measures taken 
by polluters, whereas climate change mitigation denotes a macro-level effort that 
is conducted through policies. There is an almost infinite number of technical 
measures or behavioral changes that an operator can take in order to reduce 
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emissions. Analyzing such individual abatement measures would burden the 
analysis with too much detail when assessing the effect of the EUETS as a whole 
on EES. Based on the climate mitigation options suggested by the IPCC, 
abatement measures are therefore grouped into classes of abatement options. For 
the remainder of this study I therefore use the terms “mitigation option”, 
“abatement category” and  “abatement option” interchangeably to denote the five 
categories given below.  
The energy sector, which includes extraction, conversion, storage and 
transmission of energy, is the largest contributor to climate change with 
approximately 35% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010 (IPCC, 
2014b:7), and the industry sector, which is mostly concerned with the conversion 
of natural resources into materials, is the second largest contributor to climate 
change with ca. 30% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions (IPCC, 2014d:8). The 
coverage of the EUETS overlaps to a large extent with those two sectors: it covers 
large industrial installations and power generation20 (i.e. power plants) (cf. EEA, 
2013:21). While it is not an exact overlap because e.g. energy transmission or 
smaller industrial installations lie outside the scope of the EUETS (cf. Directive 
2009/29/EC, Annex 1), we assume that the main climate mitigation options that 
the IPCC compiled for the energy and industry sectors, nevertheless apply to the 
installations covered by the EUETS. The IPCC suggests that the emission 
reduction options in the energy sector consist mainly of switching from high-
carbon to low-carbon or no-carbon energy sources, while options in the industrial 
sector are mainly increasing energy efficiency of industrial processes, and 
switching to low-carbon energy carriers (e.g. electricity from renewable sources) 
(IPCC, 2014c:84). For the energy and industry sectors, the IPCC thus compiled 
five concrete climate mitigation categories: 
 
• Switch to RES (renewable energy sources) (IPCC, 2014b:21-22) 
• Switch to gas (ibid:19) 
• Switch to nuclear (ibid:23-25) 
• Use of CCS (carbon dioxide capture and storage) (ibid:25-27) 
• Energy efficiency improvements (IPCC, 2014d:20) 
 
The problem with emissions abatement under the EUETS is that, even though it is 
the desired outcome of the policy, no systematic data collection is performed by 
official bodies (Martin et al., 2012:43). The few existing studies on abatement 
under the EUETS rely largely on econometric modeling, comparing the actual 
emissions under the EUETS to so-called hypothetical/counterfactual/business-as-
                                                                                                                                                   
 
20 the EUETS also covers aviation inside the EU, but the total effect in terms of GHG reductions of aviation-
based emissions is rather small compared to the industrial and energy sectors, and it is also unclear whether the 
inclusion of aviation will be continued (European Commission, 2013g), and I therefore do not consider the 
aviation sector in this study. 
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usual projections of how emissions would have developed without the EUETS (cf. 
Laing et al., 2013:6-8; Ellerman & Buchner, 2008:277-280). Only Point Carbon, a 
consultancy, appears to directly analyze abatement behavior by surveying 
companies, however the evidence is anecdotal (Laing et al., 2013:7; Point Carbon 
2009).  
Another way to infer abatement choices would be to analyze energy 
consumption patterns of operators under the EUETS. Despite relentless and time-
consuming searches, I could not find data on neither the amount nor kind of fossil 
fuels that the installations covered by the EUETS consume. I could thus not find 
any data that would link CO2 emissions in the EUETS to more specific fuels like 
oil, gas or coal, rather than just to fossil fuels in general as is done in the annual 
progress reports published by the EEA (cf. “combustion” EEA, 2013:21). As far 
as I can tell, fuel consumption statistics specifically for the EUETS sector are not 
published separately. This is a pity because fuel consumption statistics for the 
EUETS sector could make visible the EUETS’s effect on fuel choices, and thus on 
ES. Fuel consumption data for the EUETS sector would also allow us to know 
how large the share of the EUETS is relative to total fossil fuel consumption in 
the EU. As long as we do not know the changes in energy consumption that were 
made under the EUETS, we cannot analyze their impact on ES or attempt to relate 
them to abatement choices. What is even more frustrating is that almost all CO2 
emissions under the EUETS are calculated from fuel consumption, using the 
calculation-based method of the EUETS directive (Art. 21, Commission 
Regulation 601/2012). Hence fuel consumption data for the EUETS are collected, 
because CO2 emissions are calculated from how much fuel an installation 
consumes, but they do not seem to be published anywhere. The lack of available 
data on actual abatement behavior also creates a problem when attempting to 
attribute causality. In the absence of abatement data, how can we be sure, that the 
emission reductions that took place, were actually caused by the EUETS, and not 
by e.g. the financial and economic crisis which depressed output?  
2.2 Policy Background of Energy Security 
ES is nowadays an important policy concern for the EU, so important that it is 
even a stated goal21 of EU energy policy in the Lisbon treaty (Art. 194§1(b) 
TFEU, EU, 2010). In this thesis, energy security (ES) is defined as a function of 
availability, accessibility, and reliability of energy supplies22. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
21 Article 194§1(b) TFEU (EU, 2010): “...Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between 
Member States, to: ... (b) ensure security of supply in the union” 
22 For a more detailed discussion of ES and its constitutive concepts, see section 3.2. 
  13 
2.2.1 European Policies with a Bearing on Energy 
The heading already announces it to the attentive reader: there is no common 
European energy policy in the same sense that there is a Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) etc. Instead there are several fragmented policies with varying 
degrees of priority and varying degrees of impact on energy (Andoura, 2010:69). 
With the exception of some narrow provisions in the Euratom treaty, energy was 
never awarded the status of a “common” policy with its own legal basis in the 
treaties as in agriculture, the internal market or the customs union (Adelle et al., 
2009:18; Nilsson, 2011:1509, Andoura, 2010:2). Just like foreign policy and 
national security, energy policy and especially ES have been jealously guarded 
national policy remits where MS have been reluctant to transfer competence to the 
EU (Langsdorf, 2011:2; Andoura et al., 2010:25-26). Notwithstanding intense EU 
lobbying vis-a-vis MS at every energy crisis since the first oil crisis in 1973 (cf. 
Andoura, 2010:18-21; cf. Langsdorf, 2011:5), energy policy has largely remained 
a national affair (Nilsson, 2011:1509). This means, that the EU was never given 
the competence to formulate, propose and let alone implement a comprehensive 
European policy on energy.  
The two avenues for exercising influence in energy policy that are being used 
by the EU today are the internal energy market (IEM), and environmental and 
especially climate policy (Tosun & Solorio, 2011:4; cf. Nilsson, 2011:1509). The 
idea of establishing an internal energy market is a logical continuation of the 
competences conferred upon the EU in the SEA and the Maastricht treaties to 
establish and regulate the internal market (ibid). Starting in 1996 several energy 
market packages were proposed and passed in order to also establish an internal 
market in energy and to guarantee free and fair competition (Wettestad et al., 
2012:74). The Commission today oversees and regulates the internal energy 
market in tight cooperation with national regulators. Issues such as guaranteed 
access to grids and transparent price competition, but also such things as, 
ownership unbundling of generation, distribution and retail assets in the electricity 
and gas markets and establishing interconnections between national grids and 
networks are all part of the IEM policy (Nilsson, 2011:1520). The declared 
purpose behind establishing the IEM is to achieve affordability for European 
energy consumers (Andoura et al., 2010:27). The belief is that open and 
transparent energy markets are more efficient and that a larger IEM will allow 
companies to realize economies of scale, both of which should put downward 
pressure on energy prices (ibid:28). 
The other route for the EU to shape energy policy is through the “backdoor” 
of environmental policy integration (EPI) (Tosun & Solorio, 2011:5). Compared 
to energy, the EU enjoys a somewhat stronger position and more political will by 
the MS for legislating environmental policies. The political will was especially 
strong in the run-up to the COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, when the EU wanted to 
act as an international leader on climate policy and wanted to have policies in 
place, which demonstrated its credible commitment to climate policy goals 
(Oberthür & Roche, 2008:39). EPI is a principle, which basically states that 
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policies that have an impact on environmental goals must be adapted to reflect 
environmental concerns23 (Persson, 2004:13).  The principle of EPI is even 
explicitly mentioned in Art. 11 TFEU (EU, 2010). Because energy policy has 
quite a large impact on climate policy goals the EU has used the justification of 
EPI to significantly influence energy policy through the implementation of 
climate policy measures (Tosun & Solorio, 2011:5). Some of the goals24 of the 
CEP are realized through policies directly targeting the energy sector, such as the 
“renewables directive” (2009/28/EC) the “EUETS directive” (2009/29/EC) or the 
“Energy Efficiency Directive” (2012/27/EU). Whether one calls it climate policy 
that affects the energy sector, or whether one calls it energy policy in pursuit of 
climate goals is more a question of branding and keeping MS happy than of 
content. According to the European Commission (2013h), at least two of the three 
targets of the CEP (the renewables target and the energy efficiency target) also 
promote energy security. 
The introduction of Article 194 TFEU in the Lisbon treaty (EU, 2010) marks 
the first time, that an enabling provision on energy policy is part of the treaties 
(Filis & Leal-Arcas, 2013:1251). This provision however is no energy policy by 
itself, and it provides no tools for achieving any of the policy goals stated in it 
(ibid). While its effective use as a legal basis is hampered by a derogation from 
the ordinary legislative procedure, which effectively allows a national veto (Art. 
194§2 TFEU, EU, 2010), it may yet serve as a legal basis for future legislation on 
energy policy if the MS can agree. In practice, energy policy today is only being 
comprehensively pursued (if at all) at the national level (Andoura et al, 2010:69). 
2.2.2 Attempts of a European Energy Security Policy 
Because of the EU’s high import dependence in energy and perhaps also against 
the backdrop of the gas supply disruptions suffered in January 2006 in connection 
with the Russia - Ukraine gas dispute25, the EU published a Green Paper in March 
2006 in which it calls for a “common response” to the ES challenges of the EU 
(European Commission, 2006). Perhaps unsurprising to the reader, and despite a 
positive reception of the green paper, little concrete action has followed in terms 
of policies or legal instruments (Andoura et al., 2010:49). Instead of concrete 
action there has been a ritual of diagnosing the problem of energy security of 
supply in the EU, and of formulating high-flying policy solutions for solving it 
(ibid). Already in the year 2000, the European Commission published a detailed 
green paper entitled “Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy 
Supply” (European Commission, 2000). Strategies have since been formulated but 
the EU has still not acted on them. The latest communications by the Commission 
on the future energy policy of the EU, the Energy 2020 Strategy (European 
Commission, 2010) and the Energy Roadmap 2050 (European Commission, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
23 i.e. become “integrated” with environmental policy 
24 The famous 20-20-20 targets (see section 2.1.1) 
25 For a comprehensive assessment of the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute see Pirani et al., (2009) 
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2011) have continued to embrace new ambitions for EU energy policy at the same 
time as no concrete legislative progress is made.  
 The case of Germany pursuing the Nordstream pipeline in a bilateral 
agreement with Russia, despite objections by Brussels, Sweden, Poland, and the 
three Baltic states, which were circumvented by the pipeline, illustrates the 
impotence of the EU in foreign affairs and energy security policy (Filis & Leal-
Arcas, 2013:1270).  
In the realm of ES, three legal instruments concerning the stability of the oil, 
gas and electricity supply respectively, are some of the few concrete measures the 
EU has actually implemented26. These measures mandate emergency stocks in oil 
and gas and common operational procedures for their use, as well as grid 
interconnections and emergency procedures in case of electricity blackouts 
(Andoura et al., 2010:52-54). In light of the fragmented and incomplete state of 
European energy policy and short of a dedicated European energy security policy 
or exclusive European competence in this area, the best the EU can do is to 
“reverse-engineer” EPI into some sort of “energy policy integration” to ensure 
that the existing policies like the EUETS support the stated policy goal of ES (cf. 
Gault, 2007:2).  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
26 Council Directive 2009/119/EC for oil, EU Regulation No. 994/2010 for gas, Directive 2005/89/EC for 
electricity. 
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3 Theory 
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of institutional interaction in 
order to conceptualize how one policy such as the EUETS may influence another 
policy (or policy goal) such as EES. The second part of this chapter introduces the 
concept of energy security and puts forward an operational definition of ES with 
the help of which an ES analysis of the five abatement options can then be 
performed in the analysis chapter. 
 
3.1 Institutional Interaction  
3.1.1 Institutional Interaction and Related Concepts  
When asking how the EUETS affects EES, analytically we are dealing with the 
question of how one policy impacts, influences or interacts with another policy. 
This sort of question has been examined by many different authors in a range of 
different policy contexts, and theorizing around this question has taken place 
under several different labels. In search for a suitable analytical framework I 
reviewed the theories of Environmental Policy Integration (EPI, cf. Underdal, 
1980; Persson, 2004), Policy Coherence for Development (PCD, cf. Den Hertog 
& Stross, 2011:4), Climate Mainstreaming/Climate Policy Integration (CPI, cf. 
Mickwitz et al., 2009; Dupont&Oberthür, 2012) and Policy Coherence (cf. Den 
Hertog & Stross, 2011; Nilsson et al., 2012). The problem with all of these 
approaches is that they are too prescriptive and insufficiently analytical. They 
either prescribe ways for achieving integration/coherence/consistency etc. or they 
present rather incomplete approaches for analyzing the degree of 
coherence/integration/consistency etc. between two policies. In this study, 
however I would like to start one step prior and analyze how policies interact 
rather than presupposing an interaction and already analyzing the degree of it.  
After a very extensive literature search I found a theoretical model that 
provides the tools for analyzing the preceding step, and fittingly enough it is 
called Institutional Interaction. It is by far the most complete as well as detailed 
analytical concept of its kind that I came across in my search for theory. It is also 
the approach that fits best with the purpose of this study, because it provides a 
useful framework for analyzing and understanding interactions directly i.e. the 
causal mechanism that connects cause and effect, rather than only the outcome of 
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interactions. I thought it to be problematic at first to rely exclusively on the model 
provided by Oberthür&Gehring (2006), a single source, for conceptualizing the 
interaction between the EUETS and EES. However the completeness of the 
model, its analytical fit with the research question and the fact that few 
alternatives exist in the under-theorized field of interaction, as well as its limited 
claims to explain the empirical world make a strong argument for relying on it 
anyway despite a certain risk of bias coming from the dependence on a single 
source.  
3.1.2 Defining Institutional Interaction 
Because they found existing analytical concepts insufficient, Oberthür & Gehring 
developed Institutional Interaction as an analytical framework for their empirical 
study analyzing the interactions of eleven international environmental regimes 
and EU policies (2006:9, 22). The main tenets of the conceptual framework are 
the concepts of institutional interaction, of institutions and of causal mechanisms. 
Institutional interaction refers to a causal relationship between two 
institutions, where the source institution exerts influence on the target institution, 
thus affecting the institutional development and effectiveness (performance) of 
the target institution (Breitmeier, 2000:45; Oberthür&Gehring, 2006:26). But how 
are institutions defined in this context? Oberthür & Gehring (2006:5) employ 
Keohane’s (1989:3) definition of institutions as “persistent and connected sets of 
rules and practices that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activities and shape 
expectations”. Of the institutions defined in such a way, I only focus on 
deliberately established (negotiated) institutions because they are employed 
instrumentally to bring about societal change, e.g. achieve specific policy 
objectives (Oberthür&Gehring, 2006:23). Institutions may also emerge as a result 
of spontaneous uncoordinated behavior, examples would be the institutions of 
state sovereignty and international customary law, but such institutions are not 
created and developed intentionally as governance instruments and therefore not 
at the focus of our study of institutional interaction (ibid). Negotiated institutions 
generally consist of two parts 1. substantive rules and obligations that indicate 
socially desirable behavior, and 2. particular decision-making processes from 
which norms and behavioral guidelines emerge (ibid:23). Governance institutions 
are designed to influence the behavior of relevant actors in order to achieve 
specific policy goals (ibid:39). Sectoral EU policies as expressed in regulations 
and directives are considered functional equivalents of negotiated institutions, as 
they usually include norms and guidelines which prescribe desirable behavior to 
specific actors, and EU policies usually also have their own decision-making 
processes, both in the form of specific comitology procedures for implementation 
and one of several legislative procedures for their formulation and amendment 
(ibid:25). The supranational bodies of the EU, which are also often and 
confusingly called “European institutions” are not considered institutions 
according to our definition, because they do not represent a system of norms, rules 
and decision-making processes that was deliberately created to govern a given 
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policy area, but rather they are seen as general organizational arrangements 
(ibid:24).  
Recalling the definition of institutional interaction from the previous 
paragraph, establishing a specific case of institutional interaction requires three 
steps (ibid:26): 
 
1. Identifying the source institution and the relevant rules/decisions from 
which influence originates. 
2. Identifying the target institution and the relevant parts of the target 
institution or issue areas governed by it that are subject to the influence of 
the source institution. 
3. Identifying a unidirectional causal pathway connecting the two 
institutions, which crucially must include an observable effect on the target 
institution. 
 
The effect on the target is constitutive of a case of interaction, without a 
discernible effect on the target institution there is no interaction. Interaction here 
is defined as one single unidirectional relationship that runs from source 
institution to target institution (ibid:27). It does not mean that influence runs back 
and forth between institutions (ibid). When institutional interaction occurs, it is 
often the case that there are multiple cause-effect relationships that run in multiple 
directions between two or more institutions, and sometimes even in different 
temporal sequences. In such a situation, each one of the cause-effect relationships 
should be seen as a separate case of interaction, and analyzed in isolation. The key 
to analyzing institutional interaction is thus the disaggregation of a complex 
situation into an appropriate number of cases of interaction (ibid:29-30). The 
causal link itself is a product of the nature of the relationship between the source 
and the target institution. Disaggregation does not prevent one from recombining 
cases of institutional interaction into a more complex picture, once each causal 
relationship has been analyzed individually (ibid:31). 
3.1.3 Causal Mechanisms of Institutional Interaction 
Oberthür&Gehring (2006:32) describe a causal mechanism as “[...]a set of 
statements that are logically connected and provide a plausible account of how a 
given cause creates an observed effect” (ibid:32). It can be thought of as an 
abstract model or a hypothesis of the actual causal pathway that a case of 
institutional interaction follows that must be theoretically coherent, but cannot be 
empirically right or wrong (ibid:33). Before causal mechanisms can be described, 
the basics of the model need to be introduced: micro and macro levels, actors, 
output, outcome and impact.  
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In agreement with authors such as Buzan, Jones and Little (1993), Alexander and 
Giesen (1987) and others, Oberthür and Gehring (2006:32) also distinguish 
between a micro and a macro level as the basis for describing the agent-structure 
relationship. They see relevant institutions, both source and target as located on 
the macro level, where rules, norms, decisions and knowledge reside. In 
institutional interaction actors on the micro level are the crucial link between 
cause and effect, between source institution and target institution. Institutions such 
as an EU policy cannot directly act, they merely produce output, i.e. knowledge or 
norms that may prescribe, proscribe or permit behavior. Actors are the targets of 
the output of institutions. In the case of the EUETS the actors at whom the output 
is directed are mainly the operators of large GHG-emitting installations, however 
there is a wide range of possible types of actors. The actual behavior change in 
actors that the output of an institution achieves is called outcome. This outcome 
may or may not result in an impact on the ultimate target of governance or on a 
target institution (ibid:34). In a practical example, the output may be seen as the 
ban of drinking when driving. While the outcome of the ban is the actual 
behavioral change of drivers not drinking when they drive, the impact on the 
ultimate target of governance is a decrease in road accidents and fatalities.  
 
 
Figure 2. The logic of causal mechanisms 
Source: Adapted from Oberthür & Gehring (2006:33) 
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Since the effect on the target institution is constitutive of institutional interaction 
(ibid:27) it forms the starting point of any inquiry into the causal mechanism that 
ties together source and target institution (ibid:35). Oberthür&Gehring (2006:32) 
developed four distinct causal mechanisms:  
 
• cognitive interaction,  
• interaction through commitment  
• behavioral interaction   
• impact-level interaction  
 
These mechanisms describe four different ways in which source institutions may 
affect target institutions.  
Cognitive interaction stipulates that the decision-making process of a target 
institution will be influenced if information, knowledge or ideas produced within 
the source institution modify the perception of relevant decision-makers in the 
target institution. The changed perception of the decision-makers may in turn alter 
the decisions of target institutions and thus their output (Oberthür&Gehring, 
 
 
Figure 3. The four causal mechanisms of institutional interaction 
Source: Adapted from Oberthür & Gehring (2006:43) 
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2006:35). Cognitive interaction is purely based on persuasion and may thus be be 
resisted by the target institution.  
Interaction through commitment is thought to take place when actors entered 
commitments at the source institution, which entail certain obligations and 
subsequently change their preferences vis-a-vis the target institution. It is based on 
the desire of actors to avoid mutually incompatible obligations. In this particular 
form of interaction temporal sequence is important as already existing 
commitments usually are the ones that influence preferences of actors vis-a-vis 
other institutions and subsequent commitments.  
The third distinct causal mechanism is behavioral interaction. In this 
particular model of interaction the target institution is affected at the outcome 
level by the behavior of actors that has been caused by the source institution. At 
the start the source institution’s output influences the behavior of actors within the 
source institution’s domain (outcome). These behavioral changes impact the 
outcome of the target institution thus influencing its performance and 
effectiveness. The effect of behavioral interaction on the target institution is 
produced by the uncoordinated behavior of actors and does not depend on any 
decision in the target institution. It thus marks a large degree of unilateral 
influence of the source institution over the target institution. (Oberthür&Gehring, 
2006:39-41) 
The fourth causal mechanism developed by the two authors is impact-level 
interaction. In this case the governance objective of the source institution is 
functionally linked to the governance objective of the target institution, so that the 
achievement of the objective of the source institution itself influences the 
achievement of the objective of the target institution. In practice, impact-level 
interaction is difficult to observe because it is often diffuse, involves long causal 
chains and requires expert scientific knowledge of both issue areas in question. 
(Oberthür&Gehring, 2006:39-41, 44) 
3.1.4 Categorizing Impacts on the Target Institution 
It is important and interesting to assess what kind of effects a given case of 
interaction has on the ultimate governance objectives (i.e. policy goals) of the 
target institution because it answers the question whether a given case of 
institutional interaction is desirable from the point of view of the target institution 
(e.g. EES). The consequences of institutional interaction may be assessed in terms 
of their effect on the policy direction of the target institution (Oberthür&Gehring, 
2006:45). Policy direction indicates “the direction of collectively desired change 
or the objective of maintaining a desired status quo against a collectively 
undesired change” (Gehring, 1994, 443-449). Oberthür & Gehring (2006:46) 
categorize the effects of institutional interaction on the policy direction of the 
target institution as beneficial, adverse or neutral. In this study the effects on the 
target institution are called positive effect, indeterminate effect and trade-off.  
In the policy analysis literature positive effects of one policy on another are 
often called synergies (cf. Oberthür&Gehring, 2006:46; Adelle et al., 2009:22-25, 
Kruyt et al., 2009:2173; etc.). In my opinion, using the word synergy to denote a 
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positive effect is an inaccurate and misleading use of the term because synergy is 
defined as: “The interaction or cooperation of two or more organizations, 
substances, or other agents to produce a combined effect greater than the sum of 
their separate effects” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2005). According 
to Oberthür&Gehring’s own definition (2006:46), the main question is whether 
the effect is beneficial, adverse or neutral. Whether it is larger than the sum of its 
parts or not is secondary at best and does not form the center of analytical focus.  
In order to denote the situation that arises when institutional interaction has 
adverse consequences on the target institution I employ the term trade-off. In their 
book on public sector reform, Pollitt&Bouckaert (2011:184), define a trade-off as 
a situation where “... lessening one problem inevitably diminishes some other 
wished-for quality or increases a different problem”.  
The third term employed by the authors is “indeterminate effect” 
(Oberthür&Gehring, 2006:46) which I find fitting for the situation where the 
nature of the effect on the target institution is either neutral or cannot be 
determined. 
 
 Figure 4. Classification of impacts on target institution 
 
Nature of effect on target institution Resulting situation 
beneficial positive effect 
adverse trade-off 
neutral indeterminate effect 
 
3.1.5 The EUETS and European Energy Security as a Case of 
Institutional Interaction 
Let’s recall from the previous section that identifying institutional interaction 
requires three steps: identifying the source institution and the specific rules from 
which influence originates, identifying the target institution and the parts of it that 
are subject to influence from the source institution and identifying a unidirectional 
causal pathway between the two institutions where a causal mechanism is at work. 
The first step is to identify the institutions: the EUETS as the source institution 
and EES as the target institution. The EUETS is a based on the EUETS directive 
(2009/29/EC) and as such it has already been defined as the functional equivalent 
of an institution by Oberthür & Gehring (cf. 2006:25). The specific rule of the 
source institution (the EUETS) where influence is assumed to originate, has 
already been identified in the previous chapter (Section 2.1.3) as the abatement 
options that operators have in order to reduce their GHG emissions, which are 
thought to influence EES. EES has been included in the Lisbon treaty as a policy 
goal for European energy policy (Art. 194§1 TFEU, EU, 2010). As such it also 
represents norms of behavior that are directed at actors, in this case the member 
states of the EU and its supranational bodies. Even though Art. 194 TFEU does 
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not put a specific legal obligation on MS or EU supranational bodies, the 
specification of ES goals can be seen as recommendations or statements of intent, 
and since Oberthür&Gehring have not specified the degree of bindingness that 
norms, rules and guidelines must have, I interpret them to be sufficient for 
Art.194§1 TFEU to fulfill the first half of the definition of institution put forward 
by Oberthür&Gehring (2006:23)27.  
The second half of the definition of institution makes reference to a decision-
making process, which enables the institution to formulate and amend its norms 
(Oberthür&Gehring, 2006:23). In the case of EU legal instruments such as 
directives and regulations, the decision-making procedures of comitology and the 
legislative procedure that precedes their creation are considered by 
Oberthür&Gehring (2006:24-25) as equivalents of the kind of decision-making 
procedures present in institutions. At the time of writing (2014), there exists no 
specific EU directive or regulation for achieving EES, and there is therefore no 
comitology procedure for implementation either. But Art.194 TFEU does have an 
enabling provision in §2, which specifies the ordinary legislative procedure for 
adopting specific legal instruments for energy policy or ES policy. I interpret the 
enabling provision in Art. 194§2 TFEU to be the kind of decision-making process 
that defines institutions. It allows the target institution of EES to amend and 
formulate its rules and guidelines. EES thus also fulfills the second criterion for 
being an institution. The specific aspect of the target institution that is assumed to 
be susceptible to influence from the source institution, is the policy goal of energy 
security of supply that is stated in Art. 194§1 TFEU (EU, 2010). It is one of the 
ultimate targets of governance28 of the target institution, and if it is influenced, the 
performance of the target institution (i.e. the achievement of some of its policy 
goals) is impacted. The definition of security of supply is discussed in the second 
half of this chapter. 
Having identified both the EUETS and EES as institutions, and their aspects 
where influence originates and impacts respectively, the unidirectional causal 
pathway that is assumed to exist between these institution only becomes clear 
once the analysis of each abatement option in chapter five is performed. Once the 
details of each causal link are described, they can be categorized into one of the 
four causal mechanisms, and the nature of the impact on the target institution can 
be assessed. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
27 “Negotiated institutions generally consist of ... 1.) substantive rules and obligations that indicate socially 
desirable behavior...” 
28 using the terminology of Oberthür&Gehring, 2006:34 
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3.2 Energy Security 
Energy Security is a fuzzy concept, and there is no consensus among researchers 
and policy analysts about its exact definition or its operationalization (Valentine 
in Sovacool, 2010:56; Checchi et al., 2009:3). It is both a policy goal and an 
analytical category. The analytical category, defining what ES actually means, 
comes first. Relative to the chosen definition, one can then assess the current ES- 
situation as well as formulate a desired state of affairs as a policy goal (cf. 
Seebregts et al., 2007:19). In this study, the potential impact on ES of the different 
abatement options available under the EUETS is analyzed relative to the concept 
of security of supply as employed by the EU. Because I analyze the impact of the 
EUETS on the institution of European Energy Security as embodied by Art.194§1 
TFEU and several policy papers (cf - section 3.1.5), I choose to also use the same 
definition of ES as the EU.  
Starting with the green paper “A European strategy for the sustainable, 
competitive and secure energy” in the year 2006, the European Commission has 
defined three separate goals for its energy policy: sustainability, competitiveness 
and security of supply (European Commission, 2006:17). In the energy policy 
research field many other approaches to defining ES exist and are used, but the 
European Commission has kept its analytical categories the same over the years. 
It has employed them in the 2007 Communication “An Energy Policy for Europe” 
(European Commission, 2007:3-4), in the 2008 Communication “Second Strategic 
Energy Review” (European Commission, 2008:4), in the 2010 Communication 
“Energy 2020. A Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy” 
(European Commission, 2010:2) as well as in the latest policy paper, the 2011 
Communication “Energy Roadmap 2050” (European Commission, 2011:5). 
Unfortunately, I could not find a more detailed definition of security of supply 
provided by the EU itself. Even though the policy goal of security of supply 
features somewhat ubiquitous in official EU documents on EU energy policy, if 
there are specifications at all, they usually consist of concrete measures or 
initiatives that increase ES rather than a definition of the concept. It will therefore 
be necessary to lean on other sources for the definition of security of supply. 
Competitiveness refers to the question of whether the available energy supplies 
can be consumed at a price, which “will not adversely affect the performance of 
the economy” (APERC, 2007:6). Sustainability of energy supplies refers to the 
notion that the energy that is supplied also needs to live up to certain minimum 
social and environmental requirements (Kruyt et al., 2009:2171). 
In this study I use the term ES synonymously with security of supply (cf. 
Kruyt et al, 2009:2167) and deliberately exclude competitiveness and 
sustainability from its definition. Also the EU treats security of supply, 
competitiveness and sustainability as separate concepts, both in Art.194§1TFEU 
and in the above-mentioned publications. While I do acknowledge that both 
competitiveness and sustainability are important goals of energy policy, I do not 
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consider them part of the definition of ES for practical reasons of analytical 
clarity. To include sustainability would make it difficult or impossible to identify 
trade-offs between the EUETS goals and ES, because sustainability is part of 
both. Climate mitigation can be viewed as being part of environmental 
sustainability29 and if sustainability is also part of ES, every time an abatement 
option under the EUETS fulfills its own policy goal of climate mitigation, it 
would automatically also partly contribute to ES. It would thus always count as a 
partly positive influence on ES, even when it is in contradiction to the other goals 
of ES. To avoid this sort of double-counting the sustainability criterion is not 
included in the ES definition for this study (cf. Winzer, 2012:41). Similarly, 
competitiveness is an economic criterion and the EUETS is a policy instrument 
that uses economic (dis-)incentives by putting a price on GHG emissions. Since 
the EUETS works via the price mechanism, it is bound to have multiple economic 
impacts on competitiveness because it essentially makes energy from fossil fuels 
more expensive. The impacts on competitiveness certainly do merit study, and 
indeed, contrary to the ES- aspects of the EUETS, the potential economic impacts 
of the EUETS were evaluated by the EU in a policy impact assessment of the 
proposed climate and energy package in the year 2008 (European Commission, 
2008b). I concur with Winzer (2012:41) in the assertion that competitiveness 
should be considered an issue of economic efficiency rather than of ES. The 
inclusion of a “competitiveness” sub-concept in ES would risk rendering ES 
meaningless because every economic impact of the EUETS, of which there are 
bound to be many, would also count as an impact on ES.  
3.2.1 Defining ES: Availability, Accessibility and Reliability 
Security of supply, or the continuous and uninterrupted availability of energy 
(Groenenberg & Wetzelaer, 2006:6), can be summarized to mainly depend on 
three sub-concepts: availability, accessibility and reliability of energy supplies (cf. 
Sovacool & Mukherjee, 2011:5347-5352; APERC, 2007:5-6). These sub-concepts 
of ES focus on the requirements that are considered necessary to achieve a secure 
energy system. Choosing these three sub-concepts of security of supply comes 
after multiple iterations through many scientific articles concerning the definition 
of ES. As has been mentioned in the beginning of the section, there is no 
consensus definition of ES. But it is the impression of this author that the concepts 
behind the labels of “availability, accessibility and reliability” are counted as 
constitutive of ES by most authors, even if they sometimes carry different labels 
like “sovereignty, robustness and resilience” (cf. Cherp & Jewell, 2011:206). 
Availability refers to the physical existence of sufficient energy sources to 
satisfy the demand of a given economy or society (Sovacool & Mukherjee, 
2011:5345; Checchi et al., 2009:1; APERC, 2007:5). The availability aspect of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
29 i.e. climate mitigation is part of keeping the ecosystem of the earth intact, for the original definition of 
sustainability please see WCED (1987) a.k.a. the “Brundtland Report” 
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security of supply has to do with the scarcity of primary fuels (Kruyt et al, 
2009:2167). It deals with such questions as; “Is there enough oil in the ground to 
satisfy present and future demand?”, or “Would it be physically possible to fuel 
the cars of the world with biofuels?”, but also “Could we produce all the 
electricity we need from renewable energy sources (RES)?”. Availability is the 
most basic constraint on ES. If the energy resource is not there, it cannot be 
consumed. The more energy that is available of a given energy source the better it 
is considered for energy security. 
Accessibility refers to geopolitical circumstances and international relations 
determining or influencing the access to energy resources. The basic issue in 
accessibility is resource concentration, i.e. the uneven global distribution of 
energy resources, plus the fact that energy is often not consumed and produced in 
the same place (Kruyt et al, 2009:2167; Adelle et al, 2009:21; IEA, 2007:36). The 
fact that the EU consumes much more energy than it produces, and that it has to 
import the difference30, makes it import dependent for 52,7% of its total energy 
consumption, 62,4% of its natural gas consumption, and 84,3% of its oil 
consumption (Eurostat, 2012:29). In an EU context, accessibility is about whether 
the EU is able to acquire access to energy resources that lie outside its territory. 
Energy exporters as well as transit countries may be able to extract political 
concessions and economic rents if they are in a dominant supplier position 
(Gupta, 2008:1196). The EU and even more so Japan are both vulnerable and 
exposed to accessibility problems (IEA, 2012:76; European Commission, 2008:3). 
Phenomena such as the “energy weapon”, energy embargoes or so-called 
“pipeline politics” become relevant in the context of accessibility (Yergin, 
2006:75; Smith-Stegen, 2011:6506). In terms of accessibility it is generally 
considered better for ES if the energy is source is physically close to the place 
where it is consumed rather than far away, better if it exists in many rather than 
just a few supplier countries (diversification), it is better if the energy source is 
located in a friendly rather than in an unfriendly country, and better if the energy 
source is located in the own territory of a state rather than in the territory of 
another state. 
Reliability refers to the absence of, or safety from sudden supply disruptions, 
whether they are caused by natural disasters, technical failure or human 
interference (terrorism, etc.) (Winzer, 2012:37). It deals with questions such as the 
reliability and vulnerability of energy infrastructures to extreme events (Seebregts 
et al., 2007:17-21), but also the degree of substitutability of energy sources and 
suppliers and buffer capacity, so as to better withstand a sudden disruption of any 
single source of energy (Chester, 2010:891; Yergin, 2006:76). Reliability is 
concerned with sudden, i.e. short-term impacts (Chester, 2010:891). 
When assessing ES time plays an important role (cf. Chevalier, 2006:3; 
Chester, 2011:891). The timing, duration and sequence of events can make a 
difference for their impact on ES. In each of the three analytical categories 
presented above, the temporal dimension of ES-impacts plays a role. Insufficient 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
30 mostly in the form of fossil fuels (Eurostat, 2012:29) 
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availability of an energy source for example assumes very different degrees of 
urgency and importance depending on whether it concerns the short term or the 
long term, as the long-term depletion of an energy source can be prepared for. 
Reliability is by definition concerned with short-term impacts. But what does 
long-term or short-term actually mean in the context of energy security? Both are 
relative measures of time. Jansen & Seebregts (2010:1654) determine the long-
term to be 10 years or more and refer to investment cycles and the time for 
policies to take effect in the energy sector. Since the potential impacts of the 
abatement categories of the EUETS are on ES and therefore also on the energy 
sector, it appears useful to employ a similar duration of 7 - 10 years as 
Jansen&Seebregts (ibid) to define the long term.  
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4 Method 
4.1 Methodological Choices 
The research paradigm of this study is scientific realism. Scientific realism posits 
that knowledge can be gained by observing generative mechanisms in action 
(Pawson&Tilley, 1997:57). A generative mechanism explains an outcome by 
taking into account inputs, causal mechanisms and the context in which they 
occur (ibid:58). Insights about how generative mechanisms work are gained 
through a mixture of theorizing and realist experimentation often in the form of 
case studies (ibid:57). Scientific realism differs from positivism in the sense that 
the “control-group logic” of positivism in the social sciences only looks at inputs 
and outcomes to confirm or reject pre-set hypotheses (black-box problem), 
whereas scientific realism investigates the actual mechanisms that bind them 
together (ibid:30). Scientific realism also differs from social constructivism in the 
sense that unlike constructivism it assumes that knowledge can be neutral despite 
the risk of bias (ibid:21). Scientific realism goes hand in hand with the ontological 
position of objectivism, i.e. that reality has an existence that is independent of the 
mind and of social actors (Bryman, 2012:32), but that it is imperfectly 
apprehensible by the researcher and that facts can therefore be more or less 
perfect reflections of reality (“modified objectivism”, Healy&Perry, 2000:120). 
The scientific realism paradigm is wide-spread in the policy analysis and 
evaluation research disciplines as well as in marketing and management research, 
however discussions of research paradigm are relatively rare in the policy 
research literature (ibid; Pawson&Tilley, 1997:55-56). Scientific realism dovetails 
well with the approach taken in this study, because contrary to positivism it also 
allows for causality to be identified in single case studies (Maxwell, 2004:5). The 
theoretical framework of institutional interaction employed in this study, which 
aims to identify and describe various causal pathways (Oberthür&Gehring, 
2006:27), and hypothesizes causal mechanisms (ibid:32) rests on similar ideas 
about generating knowledge. In the context of this study, hypothesizing causal 
pathways means finding out which aspects or policy outputs of the EUETS may 
have an impact on ES, and then investigating exactly how this impact would come 
about, which is akin to describing a generative mechanism. 
This study uses theory largely in a deductive, theory-consuming fashion. The 
theoretical framework of institutional interaction is used to help explain what kind 
of relationship exists between the EUETS and EES, and the concept of ES is 
chosen as framework for assessing the impacts of the EUETS on ES. However, 
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while deductive approaches often aim to test or even develop theory (Bryman, 
2012:24-25), this study mainly consumes theory (cf. Esaiasson et al., 2007:42-44) 
in order to explain the outcome of the case, which is deemed important in its own 
right. 
4.2 Research Design: Single Case Study 
A research design “provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data” 
(Bryman, 2008:31). The research design of this thesis is a single case study 
design, utilizing qualitative data from a literature review (cf. Weimer&Vining, 
2005:310). Bryman (2008:51) states that: “a case study entails the detailed and 
intensive analysis of a single case”. George & Bennett (2005:17) define a case as 
“an instance of a class of events”. A case is the unit of analysis the research 
question prescribes (Bryman, 2008:54). It can be anything from a place, like a 
city, or a country, to a time period or a specific historical event, to an organization 
or a specific policy context (George & Bennett, 2005:17). Case studies are well-
suited to explore the existence of causal relationships, and to give a rich 
description of their nature (ibid:29). 
The case under examination in this study is the case of institutional interaction 
between EUETS and EES. It is an exploratory case study because little is known 
about the potential causal mechanism between the two policies. A “detailed and 
intensive analysis” of the causal mechanism that binds together the EUETS and 
EES is thus performed in order to answer the research question. It is a qualitative 
case study because the information necessary to answer the research question is 
mainly available in the form of qualitative data. Qualitative in this study does not 
denote the whole package31 of methodological choices often assumed to 
accompany qualitative research, but simply points out the fact that the data on 
which this study is based is text rather than numbers, and that it is analyzed using 
a literature review method rather than a quantitative method of data analysis.  
4.3 Data Collection Method: Literature Review 
The data collection method chosen for this study is a literature review method. 
The purpose of employing the literature review method in this study is not to give 
a general overview of the literature, but to elicit from the large number of existing 
reports, papers and other publications on ES and on climate mitigation, cues about 
how the EUETS may influence EES (cf. “thematic analysis”, Bryman, 2008:554). 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
31 The “qualitative research package” is often said to consist of an inductive or grounded theory approach to 
theory, an interpretivist epistemological position, and a constructionist ontological position (cf. Bryman, 
2008:366, 593). This combination is common but not binding (ibid:23, 593) 
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In line with guidelines for literature reviews (Hart, 1998) and taking cues from 
literature reviews of the ES and climate mitigation subject areas performed by 
other authors (e.g. King&Gulledge, 2013; Zhang&Wei, 2010; Månsson et al., 
2012), I defined what kind of sources to include. The sources for the literature 
review are peer-reviewed academic journals, grey literature as well as research 
anthologies and university textbooks. Grey literature denotes reports, working 
papers, policy summaries, analyses etc. from a range of organizations such as 
international organizations, government agencies, policy research consultancies as 
well as think tanks and industry associations (cf. King&Gulledge, 2014:3-4). 
What is important to consider in grey literature is that it is often government 
funded or funded by specific interest groups, and that there is therefore often a 
specific research agenda (ibid, Weimer&Vining, 2005:313-314). In both ES and 
climate mitigation the high quality and the relatively neutral and quantitative 
nature of many publications in the grey category are noteworthy. 
Doing my literature review I proceeded in two rounds. The first round was 
performed to gain a good understanding of the EUETS and of EES respectively, 
and to identify the policy outputs of the EUETS that may have an impact on ES as 
conceptualized in this study (cf. “constructing parameters”, Hart, 1998:31). 
Guiding questions (cf. Hart, 1998:60; “thematic analysis”, Bowen, 2009:32) for 
the first search round were: “how does the EUETS work, and what is its policy 
context?”, “how is ES conceptualized?”, “what is the policy situation regarding 
European energy security?” and “what aspects or outputs of the EUETS may 
influence EES?”. The search for literature was performed using the academic 
databases of Lund University (lubsearch) and a list of keywords related to the 
topic area (see appendix). With the guiding questions in mind, search results were 
skimmed, sorted, read, sorted, and finally organized using a system of searchable 
tags and annotations (cf. Bowen 2009:32; Hart, 1998:54). The keyword search 
was supplemented by snowball sampling, basically looking up the sources given 
in the articles and reports reviewed when they were given in support of statements 
or information which appeared important in relation to the guiding questions of 
the literature search (cf. “purposive sampling”, “theoretical sampling”, Bryman, 
2008:458-462). The results of the first search round are summarized in chapter 
two (background), which I consider crucial for understanding the analysis, and 
they are also contained in the second half of the theory chapter conceptualizing 
ES for this study. 
Once the five abatement categories were identified, a second search round was 
performed. This time however, in order to answer the second part of the research 
question, the guiding questions were “how does each abatement category work?” 
and “what effects does each abatement category have on availability, accessibility 
and reliability of energy supplies respectively?”. Apart from the changed guiding 
question the literature review was performed in the same way. In the absence of 
probabilistic sampling techniques, the tools of concept corroboration and category 
saturation were used as aids in order to decide what sources and how many 
sources to select as answers to the guiding questions. Saturation refers to the 
notion that the categories relating to the guiding question are filled with data from 
the reviewed literature until “[…]the point of diminishing returns, when nothing 
new is added” (Bowen, 2008:140; cf. Bryman, 2008:416, 462). Concept 
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corroboration refers to corroborating findings across different data sets and thus 
reducing the risk of bias and error (Bowen, 2009:28; Bryman, 2008:379). An 
example for corroboration from this study would be the claim that natural gas is 
traded regionally rather than globally. This claim could be found in two different 
sources, published by different organizations and with different purposes (cf. 
CRS, 2013:1; Checchi et al., 2009:15), and is also reflected in the IEA gas 
information statistics, which lists the countries buying and selling natural gas from 
each other, the amounts, and whether gas is traded by pipeline or by LNG (IEA, 
2013a:II38, II54). Especially when a piece of information determines which way 
the assessment will go, it is important that it is corroborated. 
The findings of the literature review are summarized in a condensed form, in a 
narrative that describes a potential “causal pathway” (cf. Oberthür&Gehring, 
2006:33) of how each climate mitigation option (potentially) influences 
availability, accessibility and reliability of energy supply. 
4.4 Quality Criteria 
Choosing to employ a literature review as data collection method for a case study 
in combination with the methodological stance I take in order to answer the 
research question of this study, brings up some methodological challenges. I 
address these challenges through a discussion of the research criteria for case 
studies formulated by Yin (1994:33): construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity and reliability. A separate set of quality criteria for research under the 
realist paradigm has been developed by Healy&Perry (2000), but even one of the 
creators himself, Perry (2001:318), concedes that the most widely-used and 
understood quality criteria for qualitative case studies are the ones formulated by 
Yin (1994:33).  
4.4.1 Construct Validity 
Construct validity is concerned with the link between concepts and indicators, 
with the question whether the operationalization of a concept into one or several 
indicators is actually “measuring” what the concept is looking for (Yin, 1994:34; 
Bryman, 2008:152). Case studies in particular have been the target of criticism 
relating to subjective judgments about data selection (Yin, 1994:34), and this 
study being a case study is equally susceptible to that criticism. One remedy that 
Essaiasson et al. (2007:24-25) suggest is to allow for intersubjectivity through 
transparent reasoning. This means making explicit the decisions taken in relation 
to concepts and research, and providing arguments for them (ibid). In this study, 
the research question “How does the EUETS potentially affect European energy 
security” is made more concrete step by step. First, the outcome of the EUETS 
that is most likely to affect ES is identified: abatement categories (Section 2.1.3). 
Next a theory about how a policy outcome like abatement may possibly influence 
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(affect) other policies is provided in the form of the institutional interaction 
framework (Section 3.1). Next, a concrete conceptualization of ES is provided 
(Section 3.2) including the three sub-concepts of availability, accessibility and 
reliability, against which an assessment of ES impacts can be performed. At each 
point a clear argument is presented for each choice, as e.g. the argument in 
support of the chosen conceptualization of ES excluding economic and 
sustainability aspects (Section 3.2). Rather than going the last step of developing 
qualitative and quantitative indicators for ES, the concept of ES has been 
operationalized so far that the evidence from the literature review can be assessed 
directly vis-a-vis the conceptualizations of the sub-concepts of ES.  
It has to be stated clearly that this study does not seek to establish “the one” 
influence of the EUETS on ES, but that it aims to present several plausible causal 
pathways of how the EUETS may potentially affect EES. This is not to exclude 
the possibility that other ways may also exist. The reasons for this modesty are the 
early stage and lack of agreement in theorizing ES, the complexity of the subject 
area and the absence of direct evidence on abatement in the EUETS sector. Given 
these modest aims and the correspondingly low risk of over-generalization, the 
risk of subjective data selection should weigh less heavily. 
4.4.2 Internal Validity 
The criterion of internal validity refers to the question whether the observed effect 
in the dependent variable is really caused by the independent variable, or whether 
something else had caused it (Bryman, 2008:32). This criterion is not applicable 
to this study, as we do not set out to prove the causal relationship between 
abatement options and EES impacts. Rather set out to explore a plausible causal 
pathway (cf. Oberthür&Gehring, 2006:32-33) of how the EUETS may potentially 
affect EES.  
4.4.3 External validity 
External validity is concerned with the question of whether the results of a study 
are generalizable beyond the immediate case that has been studied (Yin, 1994:36; 
Bryman, 2008:33). Most tests of external validity boil down to the sampling 
technique that has been used, because they implicitly or explicitly refer to 
statistical generalization (Yin, 1994:36). Because case studies, especially single 
case studies like this one, do not employ probabilistic sampling, statistical 
generalization of results is also not applicable (ibid). The limits to generalization 
implied by the case study design are not in contradiction to the purpose of this 
study, which considers the interaction the EUETS and EES to be sufficiently 
important to merit investigation in its own right, even if results are not 
generalizable. 
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4.4.4 Reliability 
Reliability is concerned with the question of whether the results of a study are 
stable and repeatable, i.e. whether the same results would be produced if the exact 
same study was conducted again (Bryman, 2008:31; Yin, 1994:36). In the context 
of qualitative case studies it is recommended to carefully document procedures 
(i.e. audit trail) for improving reliability32 so that studies can be repeated or 
audited (ibid). In this study, documentation is provided in the form of a list of 
search terms used for the literature search, the academic literature search engine 
(lubsearch) that was used is specified, and importantly sources for factual claims 
made in the ES-analysis are provided. It is thus possible for an auditor/evaluator 
of this study to verify each source, and to check whether the same conclusion 
would have been drawn from the evidence contained in the source.  
4.4.5 Challenges 
It has to be stated, that the choice of literature review as data collection method 
entails challenges of both low reliability and low internal validity. However these 
challenges are balanced by the specific advantages of a literature review, which 
make it possible to conduct this study at all. The literature review of existing 
studies makes it possible to assess what would otherwise be an unmanageable 
amount of data, in an economic and condensed fashion. Assessing the ES impacts 
of climate mitigation options directly, rather than through a literature review as 
for example through a comprehensive indicator approach, would produce 
enormous amounts of data and complexity and requires considerable expertise in 
economics and other disciplines, which I do not possess (cf. Kruyt et al. 2009; von 
Hippel et al., 2011; Sovacool&Mukherjee, 2011). In addition to the prohibitive 
requirements in expertise, time and resources for such a study, it would still be 
prone to bias, as there is no agreement on which indicators should be used to 
measure which sub-concept of ES and how to weigh them (cf. Winzer, 2012:42-
43). Reliability as well as internal validity would probably be superior to a 
literature review. Given the practical limitations, as well as the modest purpose of 
this study to describe only a potential causal pathway of how the EUETS 
influences EES, the literature review - case study format is still a good choice. 
Despite its shortcomings in reliability, internal validity and risk of bias, literature 
review is one of the most commonly used data collection methods in the policy 
analysis domain (Weimer&Vining, 2005:310), both for finding facts and theories 
for solving policy problems. 
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5 Analysis 
In this chapter the nature of the interaction between the EUETS (the source 
institution) and EES (the target institution) is analyzed. For each climate 
mitigation option identified in section 2.1.3, a short description of how it 
contributes to climate mitigation is given. Then a detailed analysis is performed of 
how each respective mitigation option potentially impacts availability, 
accessibility and reliability of the energy supply, and the causal pathway of 
institutional interaction thus described. Third, the impacts on ES are categorized 
as “positive effect”, “trade-off” and “indeterminate effect”. Categorizing the 
nature of the impact in such a way, allows us to answer the research question for 
each abatement option, how it potentially influences EES. Lastly, having the 
description of how each mitigation option potentially impacts ES, the kind of 
causal mechanism (i.e. cognitive, commitment, behavioral and impact) present in 
each of them is assessed. For better overview, the results of the ES-analysis are 
presented in a table at the beginning for each respective abatement option. 
5.1 Switch to Gas 
5.1.1 Climate Mitigation Impact 
Switching to gas as energy source constitutes a climate mitigation option because 
the combustion of gas emits less CO2 than other fossil fuel sources. Switching 
from the current world-average coal-fired power plant to a modern natural gas 
combined cycle power (NGCC) plant, reduces emissions per kWh by 52% over 
the life-cycle of both energy sources (Burnham et al. 2012:624). The reason for 
the lower emissions is the lower carbon content of gas compared to coal and the 
higher efficiency of combined-cycle gas power plants (ibid). The GHG emissions 
occurring during the exploitation of unconventional gas or shale gas have not yet 
been reliably quantified, but preliminary results point towards 1,8% - 2,4% higher 
GHG emissions than conventional gas (cf. Stephenson et al., 2011:10762). 
Switching from coal to gas can thus reduce GHG emissions by a maximum of 
52%, which is compatible with the 21% emission reduction target of the EUETS 
until the year 2020 (European Commission, 2013b), but insufficient for reaching 
the 80% - 95% emission reduction target that the EU has set itself for the year 
2050 (European Commission, 2011:3). Gas can thus be seen as a bridge fuel that 
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facilitates emissions reductions to a certain point but is not an option for achieving 
the long-term climate policy goals.  
The gaseous state of natural gas necessitates pipelines or other gas-tight means 
of transport and storage, which represent large infrastructure investments relative 
to the price of the product (Stern, 2002:9-10). Gas-fired power plants on the other 
hand are relatively inexpensive and quick to build compared to other power plants 
(cf. IAEA, 2013:41-42; Boyle et al., 2003:383). Natural gas is widely used as 
energy source in the industrial and power sectors (under the EUETS), and for 
residential heating (Boyle et al., 2003:254-256). Only if the distance between the 
source and the consumer is too large and gas pipelines not economical or 
technically feasible, the even more expensive method of gas liquefaction33 is used. 
LNG is then transported on large gas tanker ships to ports with dedicated LNG 
terminals where gas is de-liquefied again and pumped through local pipelines to 
the point of consumption. 
5.1.2 Impact on ES 
 
 Figure 5. Potential impact of a switch to gas on EES. 
 
Availability Accessibility Reliability 
indeterminate effect trade-off indeterminate 
 
 
With the exception of LNG, which constitutes a small share of the world gas 
market but a major energy source for Japan and the Republic of Korea (cf. IEA, 
2013a:II51, 57), and in contrast to oil, gas is not a globally traded commodity. 
Instead it has regional buyers and sellers, and prices on different regional gas 
markets differ (CRS, 2013:1; Checchi et al., 2009:15). When looking at 
availability of natural gas for Europe, one has to keep in mind this regional 
limitation. Supplies of natural gas are plentiful in North America thanks to the so-
called shale gas boom, but transport to Europe increases the price (IEA, 
2013:117). The reference scenario developed by the European Commission 
indicates that despite an overall reduction in energy demand, natural gas demand 
will remain relatively stable in absolute terms until 2050 (European Commission, 
2014:35). There are sufficient NG resources to satisfy future European demand 
(IEA, 2013:107), but they are located in producer regions outside Europe, mainly 
the Persian Gulf region, Russia, Central Asia and to a smaller extent North Africa 
(IEA, 2013a:II66-II67). Natural gas supply is estimated to be sufficient to satisfy 
future European demand, but only if the relatively uncertain reserves of 
unconventional gas are considered, do natural gas reserves come anywhere near 
the abundance of coal reserves in terms of energy content (IPCC, 2014b:16). I 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
33 LNG - liquefied natural gas 
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therefore judge a switch (presumably from coal to gas) to have an indeterminate 
effect on availability.  
Accessibility of natural gas is an important issue for the EU. In 2012 the EU 
imported 65,2% of its total natural gas consumption (Eurostat, 2014) from outside 
the union and 83,4% of these imports came from only four suppliers: Russia 
(31,9%), Norway (29,4%), Algeria (13,8%) and Qatar (8,7%, via LNG) (Eurostat, 
2014). Domestic gas production in the EU has been in decline for several years 
(CRS, 2013:1; Checchi et al., 2009:15). Despite some alleviation of the decline 
trend through the addition of domestic unconventional gas (shale) (IEA, 
2013:118), the decline of domestic gas production will continue (European 
Commission, 2014:49), so that progressively larger shares of gas demand will 
have to be satisfied through gas imports (ibid:50). Despite its large production rate 
Norway is estimated to hold only about 1% of world gas reserves in its gas fields, 
whereas Russia’s reserves are estimated at ca. 31%, Iran 17% and Qatar 13% 
(IEA, 2013a:II66). No pipeline infrastructure exists to transport gas from Iran or 
Qatar to Europe, and the security situation in Iraq and Syria as well as the current 
economic sanctions imposed by the EU on Iran make gas supply contracts with 
Iran and pipeline construction in the area unlikely. The Caspian Basin countries, 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are estimated to hold 7% 
or more of world gas resources, but so far their only export route to the EU is via 
the Russian/Soviet pipeline system (CRS, 2013:18). All of the above-mentioned 
factors seem to underline the poor accessibility of natural gas in the EU. There is 
resource concentration in a small number of countries all outside EU territory. 
The ability to diversify gas suppliers and supply routes is further hampered by the 
lack of independent pipeline infrastructure to the Central Asian countries and to 
the Persian Gulf countries, and by the high cost of LNG. Overall the choice of gas 
as a climate mitigation option has an adverse impact on the accessibility of 
energy, and there is therefore a trade-off between abating emissions by switching 
to gas and accessibility of energy. 
Concerning reliability, i.e. the risk of sudden supply disruptions, the EU is 
vulnerable to producer country risk. If Russia decides to use its position as a 
dominant supplier to the EU in order to extract political or other concessions by 
threatening to withhold gas supplies, something that Russia has never done, not 
even during the Cold War (Checchi et al., 2009:19), Europe would have some 
difficulty finding substitutes for its Russian gas imports in the short run. It is true 
that there is interdependence between exporting and importing countries, and that 
exporting countries have large infrastructure costs for gas fields and pipelines 
which require steady long-term revenue flows to amortize over many years 
(ibid:17). In the short term however interdependence is asymmetric, especially 
during the winter, importing countries are much more dependent on gas deliveries 
than exporting countries on payment (Smith-Stegen, 2011:6511). The reasons for 
supply disruptions do not have to be political, they may be as trivial as insufficient 
maintenance of some pipeline pumping station in Siberia, which may have the 
same result (Checchi et al., 2009:18). Some EU countries are almost 100% import 
dependent on natural gas and have almost no storage capacity, which leaves them 
exposed to supply disruptions (cf. Eurostat, 2012:35; IEA, 2011:7). The current 
crisis in Ukraine highlights the transit country risk, which stems from the fact that 
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most pipeline capacity from Russia to the EU crosses through third countries like 
Ukraine or Belarus, which may interrupt gas flows to extract concessions from 
both sides (Checchi et al., 2009:20). The Nordstream and South Stream gas 
pipelines built by Russia have the express purpose to reduce transit country risk 
by bypassing them via an undersea route (Boussena&Locatelli, 2013:184). The 
risk of sudden stops in gas delivery can be alleviated through storage capacity34, 
diversification of supplies (e.g. LNG terminals) and it is also alleviated by the fact 
that natural gas can be relatively easily substituted through oil or coal in 
electricity production, and that especially the price of oil acts as upper bound for 
the gas price (Tönjes&DeJong, 2007:17). In electricity production, combined 
cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power plants have an important role of covering peak 
demand as they can be cold-started within a few hours and warm-started within 
ca. 30 minutes (Boyle et al., 2003:382). CCGT are also relatively cheap and fast 
to build compared to other power plants, and are therefore favored by risk-averse 
private investors (ibid:383, 502). So while they make the electricity grid more 
reliable, they are themselves exposed to reliability risks of sudden supply 
disruptions. I thus assess a switch to natural gas to have an indeterminate effect on 
reliability, because the positives and the negatives cancel each other out.  
5.2 Switch to RES 
5.2.1 Climate Mitigation Impact 
The term renewable energy sources (RES) is an umbrella term for a range of 
different technologies which harness energy from sources which are naturally 
replenished at a rate which equals or exceeds their rate of use (IPCC, 2011:178). 
Many RES produce electricity but some produce heat or other forms of useful 
power. The main RES’s with some degree of worldwide diffusion are: hydro 
power, wind energy, geothermal energy, ocean energy, direct solar energy and 
bioenergy (ibid:174). Even these different sources still contain sub-categories like 
off-shore and on-shore for wind energy, pumped-storage or running-water for 
hydro, photovoltaic or concentrated solar thermal for solar etc. It is impossible to 
treat RES at this level of detail in this study, which is why the ES analysis of RES 
is going to focus mostly on the characteristics that are shared by the different RES 
technologies.  
RES-E35 are considered a climate mitigation option because their average life-
cycle GHG emissions in gram CO2/unit of energy are orders of magnitude smaller 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
34 Austria for example maintains underground gas storage reservoirs sufficient to store more than half a year’s 
gas consumption for the country (IEA, 2011:7). 
35 Renewable energy sources for electricity production. 
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than those of fossil fuels (Weisser, 2007:1554; cf. IPCC, 2014b:35). Mitigation 
takes place when low-GHG RES replace high-GHG fossil fuels. The direct 
emissions of RES in electricity production are often zero or close to zero (IPCC, 
2011:174) and the emissions over the lifecycle usually stem from the production 
of the energy generating machinery like turbines and from maintenance (Weisser, 
2007:1552). Some RES-E technologies (e.g. hydroelectric dams) have significant 
environmental impacts other than on climate change (IPCC, 2011:714). For Res-E 
to be feasible, there needs to be RE potential in the geographic area of their 
deployment (ibid:820). Because of several kinds of barriers, economic, technical 
and political, the deployment of RES cannot be sufficiently stimulated by a 
carbon price alone, and governments therefore devised different kinds of RE 
support policies (ibid:871-872). Under the EUETS, operators do not have to 
surrender any allowances for energy from RES (cf. 2009/29/EC, Annex 1), which 
serves as the incentive to switch to RES.  
5.2.2 Impact on ES 
 
 Figure 6. Potential impact of switch to RES on EES. 
 
Availability Accessibility Reliability 
positive effect positive effect short-term trade-off, 
long-term positive 
effect 
 
 
When it comes to availability, several studies indicate that RES-E potential both 
worldwide and in Europe exceeds current energy demand by several times (IPCC, 
2011:183). A study by the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) estimates that 
in order to satisfy not just electricity demand, but the entire energy demand of 
Europe through renewables by the year 2050, only 11% of the total technical 
renewable energy potential of the continent needs to be used (Heaps et al., 
2009:33). However the potential for individual RE technologies varies widely as 
can be seen by the difference between hydropower where approximately 64% of 
available potential are already used (DLR, 2009:116) and on-shore wind power, 
where only 0,5% of available potential are used (EEA, 2009:32) The scenarios 
developed by the SEI show that it would be technically feasible to switch the 
entire electricity production of Europe to renewables as mitigation option, even 
excluding nuclear energy and the deployment of CCS-fitted fossil-fuel power 
plants (Heaps et al., 2009:9). In the case of a full switch to RES-E, up to 85% of 
present electricity supply would have to be progressively replaced by renewables 
(ibid:36). This would imply that in the period of 2020 - 2030, 5000 large wind 
turbines per year would have to be built (ibid:32). Because of the large domestic 
potential of RES it is clear that a switch to renewables that would tap into this 
potential, would improve availability of energy supplies. 
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Because the domestic RES-E potential of the EU is rather large compared to 
its energy demand (IPCC, 2011:183) at the same time as the EU has to import 
much of its fossil fuel needs from outside the union (Eurostat, 2012:29), many ES 
assessments of a switch from fossil fuels to RES conclude that it has a positive 
impact on accessibility (cf. IPCC, 2011:724; Johansson, 2011:9-10; Checchi et al., 
2009:32). Large-scale centralized RES-E production like the desertec project36, 
may yet introduce new energy dependence on unstable regions, and large-scale 
off-shore wind farms in the North Sea may still be far away from the places where 
energy is actually consumed. However, since the potential for domestic RES-E is 
estimated to be so large that there is no need for RES-E imports, switching from 
fossil fuels to RES-E is considered to improve accessibility because it replaces 
(fossil fuel) energy sources that are concentrated outside the territory of the EU 
with (renewable) energy sources inside the territory of the EU.  
Reliability. The technologies for generating renewable electricity already 
exist, and are at different stages of maturity (IPPC, 2011:182-183). However the 
energy system needs to be adapted in order to be able to accommodate them 
(Johansson, 2011:13). In the short run, there is a risk that adding more RES-E to 
the grid without adapting the electricity system accordingly undermines reliability 
because of the intermittent nature of many RES-E. The problem of intermittency 
of some RES37 can be solved by a combination of measures including reinforcing 
transmission lines, adding pumped hydro capacity to enable load balancing38, and 
introducing demand management (Heaps et al., 2009:34-36). The problem is that 
such measures take time to implement. Building new transmission lines in Europe 
often takes much longer than building new RES-E power plants because of 
lengthy approval processes (IPCC, 2011:636; IPCC, 2014b:30). Building pumped 
hydro power stations is complicated by the many requirements mandated by the 
EU water framework directive, by long construction times and by finding 
financing for the large up-front investment requirements (IEA, 2012c:23, 42). 
Equally so, demand management requires the roll-out of so-called “smart-grid” 
technology, as well as giving consumers, especially industrial ones, time to adapt 
to the fact that their electricity consumption follows electricity production rather 
than the other way around (Heaps et al., 2009:34-36). In order to avoid reduced 
reliability of the electricity grid, expansion of RES-E generation capacity has to 
be carefully synchronized with the adaptation of the power system (Johansson, 
2011:13). The fact that under a liberalized electricity market generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity have to be strictly separate, does not 
necessarily make the task of coordinating the adaptation of the energy system any 
easier (Checchi et al., 2009:36). 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
36 A gigantic concentrated solar power (CSP) project in the Sahara desert, sending electricity to Europe via a 
high voltage transmission line (Lilliestam&Ellenbeck, 2011:3380). 
37 the fact that some renewables do not continuously produce electricity because the wind does not always blow 
and the sun does not always shine. 
38 in simple terms, load balancing means storing surplus electricity and releasing it again when there is a shortage 
(Boyle et al., 2003:379-380) 
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Once the transition to a RES-E based electricity system is successful however, 
the resulting kind of electricity system brings several benefits for reliability. 
Increased transmission capacity and demand management techniques not only 
allow the energy system to cope with sudden fluctuations in energy supply due to 
normal occurrences like weather conditions, but also if they are caused by things 
like strikes, terrorist attacks, sabotage etc. (IPCC, 2011:639). Especially pumped 
hydro power stations are currently the only power plants that can provide massive 
additional capacity within a few minutes in order to cover for unexpected peak 
electricity demand or shortfalls from intermittent sources (Boyle et al., 2003:379). 
The deployment of small-scale renewables opens up the possibility of 
decentralized generation, meaning that electricity is consumed much closer to 
where it is produced and thus avoiding conversion and transmission losses (IPCC, 
2011:181). It can thus be said, that RES-E expansion has some possible 
disadvantages for reliability in the short run, while it is a clear reliability 
improvement in the long run when the necessary infrastructure is in place. 
5.3 Switch to Nuclear 
5.3.1 Climate Mitigation Impact 
Nuclear energy produces electricity in nuclear reactors, utilizing a process called 
nuclear fission to release vast amounts of energy in controlled chain reactions 
from the core of uranium235 atoms. In this process no GHG are released which is 
why a switch to nuclear from GHG-intense energy sources qualifies as climate 
mitigation (NEA, 2009:1; IPCC, 2014b:23). Nuclear energy, just as RES, does 
however emit some GHG at different points in its lifecycle, e.g. uranium mining, 
uranium enrichment, construction of nuclear plant, nuclear waste disposal etc. 
(Weisser, 2007:1552). Even when the life cycle emissions of nuclear are taken 
into account, the resulting emissions in gCO2/kWh are orders of magnitude 
smaller than combustion of fossil fuels (ibid:1554; NEA, 2009:2). The obstacles 
to the use of nuclear energy are manifold, but they are mostly related to economic, 
sustainability and security issues rather than ES or climate concerns. There are 
serious security concerns about nuclear proliferation and catastrophic nuclear 
accidents, the question of permanent nuclear waste disposal remains unresolved, 
and the construction of nuclear infrastructure requires large up-front investments 
that only amortize after decades of successful operation (IPCC, 2014b:25; NEA, 
2009a:9-11). Only thirty countries operate nuclear reactors and only a handful 
master the complete nuclear fuel cycle (IPCC, 2014b:23). The fact that the 
EUETS counts nuclear energy as GHG-free39 increases the profitability of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
39 Nuclear power plants are not covered by the EUETS directive (cf. 2009/29/EC, Annex 1) 
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existing nuclear power plants (NPPs), but due to the existence of market barriers it 
is currently not enough of an incentive to motivate the construction of new NPPs 
(NEA, 2011:8-10). 
5.3.2 Impact on ES 
 
 Figure 7. Potential impact of switch to nuclear on EES. 
 
Availability Accessibility Reliability 
long-term positive 
effect, short-term 
indeterminate 
positive effect positive effect 
 
 
Uranium is the fuel source of the 440 civilian nuclear power plants worldwide, 
requiring 63 875 tU to produce 375 GWe or 11% of the world’s electricity (IAEA 
and NEA, 2011:12) and 28% of the EU’s electricity in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012:38). 
Of the annual uranium requirements, 85% is satisfied from uranium mine 
production, while the rest comes from spent fuel reprocessing as well as from 
downblending of highly enriched military uranium from the dismantling of 
nuclear warheads (IAEA and NEA, 2011:13). At current world demand, uranium 
supplies from the 7,1 MtU identified resources40 are calculated to last more than 
130 years (IPCC, 2014b:18). Another 7,6 MtU are reported as “undiscovered 
resources”, which are a little less certain and would add another 130 years of 
supply (IAEA and NEA, 2011:29). Forecasts of future growth in nuclear energy 
production range from the “low case” of 540 GWe to the “high case” of 746 GWe 
of installed capacity by the year 2035, compared to today’s 375 GWe (ibid:94). 
The limiting factor to availability of nuclear energy however is not primarily the 
amount of recoverable uranium in the ground but the rate of technological 
progress and the choice nuclear fuel cycle, which has important consequences for 
safety, cost and efficiency (IPCC, 2014b:24). Most countries with civilian nuclear 
power based on light water reactors use so-called “once-through” nuclear fuel 
cycles, where 95% of the uranium is left unused in spent fuel rods which go into 
nuclear waste disposal (IAEA, 2013:51). So-called fast breeder reactors in 
combination with spent fuel reprocessing could extract 50 - 70 times more energy 
from existing uranium resources than current nuclear fuel cycles (ibid). Fast 
breeder reactors are not yet commercially available, but both France and the 
Russian Federation run industrial scale breeder reactors for research and 
development purposes (ibid:52).  The cost of nuclear fuel, including processing 
and enrichment represents only a small part (10%-20%) of the total cost of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
40 Identified resources consist of the rar category (reasonably assured resources) and the inferred resources 
category (cf. IAEA and NEA, 2011:9). Both categories are relatively certain as opposed to the “undiscovered 
resources” category which is prognosticated and speculative (ibid). 
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producing electricity from nuclear power (NEA, 2009a:14). The larger challenge 
to availability of nuclear energy are its “front-loading” cost structure and the 
rather long lead times for construction of new nuclear capacity. The timely 
investment in new nuclear power plants, investments in uranium mining and in 
adequate fuel cycle infrastructure (IAEA, 2013:52) thus become critical for the 
availability of nuclear energy. NPPs are expensive to build but relatively cheap to 
operate (ibid:36). The lead-times for nuclear power projects are often ten years 
from conception until commissioning of a plant, and the up-front investment 
requirements are about 60% of the life-cycle cost of an NPP (IAEA, 2013:39, 54). 
Because of the long time periods, the large up-front investment requirements and 
the related uncertainty, sufficient investment capital for the construction of 
nuclear infrastructure is usually only found with the direct or indirect support of 
states (NEA, 2009a:49). In the context of the EU liberalized electricity markets, 
this means that exemptions from state-aid rules have to be applied for at the 
European Commission (European Commission, 2013i). All of the above implies 
that availability of nuclear power is not constrained in the long run, but that it may 
be difficult to expand nuclear within a short timeframe. 
With regards to accessibility, data of the Euratom Supply Agency for 2012 
show that the EU is import dependent for ca. 94% or of its natural uranium 
purchases (Euratom, 2014). This import dependence however is mitigated by a 
number of factors. First, yellowcake or U3O8, the form of uranium after milling 
but before enrichment, that is sold on the world market, has a high energy density 
in comparison with fossil fuels, low radioactivity, and is easy to transport and to 
store in 200-litre metal drums (Swan, 2009:49; Boyle et al., 2003:422). 
Consuming countries can thus easily accumulate buffer reserves of uranium 
equaling several years of consumption at low cost in order to protect themselves 
from supply disruptions. This is the case in the EU, where at the end of 2012, EU 
utilities had inventories of 52 362 t of natural uranium, amounting to more than 
two years of consumption (Euratom, 2014). Second, uranium mines are spread 
over the world and with the exception of Kazakhstan much of current uranium 
mining and identified uranium resources are located in stable and friendly 
countries like Australia, Canada and the US, and supply is thus diversified (NEA, 
2010:8; IAEA and NEA, 2011:18, 59). Third, for all practical purposes, nuclear 
power can be regarded as a domestic energy source, as about 90% of its inputs in 
terms of value are sourced domestically (NEA, 2010:7). This means that even if 
temporary supply shortages and associated price swings should occur on the 
world market for uranium, the impact on electricity prices is relatively limited 
compared to the situation for fossil fuels (Checchi et al., 2009:28). The modest 
share of nuclear fuel cost (10% - 20%, NEA, 2009a:14) in the total cost of nuclear 
energy production, is the reason why price swings in uranium do not threaten the 
economic viability of nuclear power production. This compares favorably to coal 
where the share of fuel cost represents 35% - 45% of the total production cost of 
electricity and natural gas where fuel cost represents 73% - 77% of the total (ibid). 
The three above-mentioned factors: low cost storage of buffer reserves, 
diversified international supply and relative immunity of consumer countries to 
price swings in uranium, give nuclear energy a relatively good accessibility, 
despite the fact that the EU is import dependent for its uranium supplies. 
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Nuclear energy is generally considered a reliable source of base-load 
electricity. For the electricity grid to work and avoid blackouts, supply and 
demand of electricity must always be in balance (Boyle et al., 2003:377-379). 
Because demand fluctuates widely throughout the day, electricity from power 
plants has to be constantly added or removed from the grid. The proportion of 
demand that is always there, and that always has to be satisfied, is called base load 
(ibid). Producing base load electricity means in simplified terms to let a power 
plant run at full capacity all the time. NPPs are ideal for base load generation 
because of their low proportion of variable and high proportion of fixed cost 
(ibid). Nuclear power is generally considered reliable, however, in the unlikely 
event of a nuclear accident, because of the inherently hazardous nature of nuclear 
technology, the resulting downtimes of an NPP are potentially very long, and the 
damage caused by nuclear accidents potentially catastrophic and irreversible 
(Checchi et al., 2009:29). In the time period from 1952 - 2009, 99 nuclear 
accidents have occurred causing US$ 20.5bn in damages (Sovacool, 2010a:379). 
Given the above description, nuclear energy can be categorized as reliable in 
terms of energy security, however highlighting the possibility of black-swan type 
negative events. 
5.4 Use of CCS 
5.4.1 Climate Mitigation Impact 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) is a process where CO2 is removed 
(captured) after combustion or other chemical processes, and is subsequently 
stored in underground geological reservoirs (IEA, 2009:9). Since it removes CO2, 
a GHG, which would have otherwise been released into the atmosphere, it 
qualifies as a climate mitigation option (IPCC, 2014b:25). The technology of CCS 
is still under development, and is still very expensive and energy-intensive (IEA, 
2012b:338-339). Cost is especially relevant under the EUETS, where an 
abatement option will only be pursued if it has lower cost than the other available 
abatement options (cf. Perman, 2011:219). The reason why I choose to analyze 
this option anyway is because great hopes are pinned on it, as CCS is included as 
a crucial component in most future climate mitigation scenarios (IEA, 
2012b:340), but also because it is expected to become commercially viable before 
2030 when the EUETS is still expected to operate (IEA, 2009:27). So far it is only 
possible to commercially capture CO2 streams of high purity (IEA, 2009:9). It is 
still prohibitively expensive to capture the sort of impure CO2 streams occurring 
in fossil fuel power plants (ibid), which are by far the largest source of CO2 
emissions under the EUETS (EEA, 2013:21). Geological storage reservoirs would 
have to be continuously monitored as accidental release could suffocate humans 
and other breathing organisms in the area of the leak as well as dangerously 
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increase atmospheric CO2 levels (IPCC, 2014b:24). At the moment CCS 
technology is able to capture about 90% of the direct CO2 emissions in the 
combustion of coal and gas (Koorneef, 2008:9-10; IPCC, 2014b:34) and to reduce 
emissions over the life-cycle of a coal power plant by ca. 78% (Koorneef, 
2008:9). For natural gas power plants with CCS the reduction of CO2 emissions 
over the life cycle is 64% - 73% compared to a plant without CCS (Singh et al., 
2011:915). The difference in emissions reductions between gas and coal CCS is 
explained by the higher proportion of emissions in other parts of the life cycle for 
gas, especially fugitive gas during extraction and transport (ibid). The IEA 
estimates that CCS technologies with 85% CO2 capture rates for all mature 
combustion processes will be commercially available around the year 2025 (IEA, 
2009:27). CCS will make possible the prolonged use of some fossil fuels while 
reaching climate mitigation goals. If used in combination with biofuels (BECCS), 
it would even make possible the removal of CO2 from the carbon cycle and thus 
be a chance to reduce atmospheric CO2 concentration (IPCC, 2014b:27). 
5.4.2 Impact on ES 
 
 Figure 8. Potential impact of CCS on EES. 
 
Availability Accessibility Reliability 
trade-off / positive 
effect 
indeterminate effect indeterminate effect 
 
CCS is not an energy source but a measure that intervenes on the demand side of 
the energy equation. As such it has one direct and several potential indirect effects 
on ES. The direct effect is called the “energy penalty”: Operating a CCS system 
consumes additional energy (IEA, 2009:26). The indirect effect on ES is fuel 
switching: CCS makes possible the continued use of fossil fuels in the presence of 
climate change mitigation. The indirect effect will be the ES impact of the fossil 
fuel source in question, which would not have been used in the absence of CCS41. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the indirect effects of CCS on ES 
that come about through fuel switching. The capture42 of CO2 increases the fuel 
use of installations by 12% - 27% (IPCC, 2005:119). Operators can only 
recuperate the cost of CCS, and will thus only deploy it, in the presence of a 
climate mitigation policy (IPCC, 2005:351). The IEA estimates that by 2025 the 
energy penalty for capture can be pushed to below 8% of additional fuel 
consumption in gas power plants (IEA, 2009:26). The energy penalty has a 
negative impact on availability of energy, as more energy is needed to produce the 
same amount of output, and existing supplies thus last shorter. CCS thus 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
41 and in the presence of climate mitigation policies 
42 not counting the energy needed for transporting or storing CO2 
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represents a trade-off for availability. However if we consider the carbon 
constraint as a fact of life the perspective changes because through CCS fossil 
energy sources become available which were previously excluded through a 
climate mitigation regime. In such a view, the deployment of CCS constitutes a 
new addition of energy sources to the resource base, and thus increases 
availability.  
CCS has no direct impact on accessibility, as it is not an energy source. Its 
indirect effects on accessibility will depend on the choice of energy source that it 
enables in the presence of a climate mitigation policy. If for example through the 
deployment of CCS a switch to gas should occur, then the already problematic 
accessibility of natural gas (cf. section 5.1.2) would be exacerbated. It lies outside 
the possibilities of this study to make predictions about which energy mix will 
result from the deployment of CCS, and it is therefore impossible to tell here 
which indirect impacts CCS will have on accessibility. 
At the moment CCS is still an experimental technology and as such it is 
normal that it is not yet reliable. Once CCS is mature enough for deployment, it is 
expected that it will not influence the reliability of any given energy source in any 
particular way (IEA, 2012b:346). Indirect effects on reliability would again result 
from the choice of fuel source enabled by CCS in the presence of climate 
mitigation policy, but cannot be analyzed in this study. 
5.5 Improving Energy Efficiency 
5.5.1 Climate Mitigation Impact 
When a process is more energy efficient it delivers more output for the same 
energy input, or the same output for less energy input (IEA, 2014). Energy 
efficiency improvements constitute a climate mitigation option if they amount to a 
reduction in energy demand (IPCC, 2014c:84) and if the energy consumed 
involved GHG emissions. If the energy in question is produced free of GHG 
emissions (e.g. certain RES), demand reduction does not matter for climate 
mitigation, because no GHGs are emitted anyway. Energy demand reduction 
through efficiency improvements represent a climate mitigation option that is not 
tied to a specific fuel source, but which is applicable to all processes where fossil 
fuel-based energy is consumed43 (IEA, 2012a:22-23). Several studies indicate that 
the potential for energy efficiency improvements in industry is as high as 25% 
(IPCC, 2014d:21). Through additional research and innovation another 20% of EE 
improvements may be added before approaching technological limits (ibid).  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
43 and also applicable to processes where non-fossil energy is consumed, but then it is no longer climate 
mitigation. 
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5.5.2 Impact on ES 
 
 Figure 9. Potential impact of energy efficiency improvements on EES. 
 
Availability Accessibility Reliability 
positive effect positive effect positive effect 
 
 
Energy efficiency (EE) improvements in the power and industrial sectors covered 
by the EUETS are expected to have several direct and indirect impacts on ES if 
they lead to demand reductions. Similar to CCS, EE improvements are also a 
measure that intervenes on the demand side of the energy equation, albeit in the 
opposite direction. While CCS carries an energy penalty, EE improvements are 
expected to lead to energy demand reduction (IEA, 2012a:16). Part of the 
efficiency savings are sometimes cancelled out by a rise in consumption: the 
rebound effect (ibid:25). Improvements in energy efficiency make the use of 
energy services cheaper, which encourages their increased use (Checchi et al., 
2008:38). The rebound effect is estimated to cancel out anywhere between 10% 
and 50% of the efficiency improvement and in rare cases even more, meaning that 
any demand reduction will only be a percentage of the EE saving (UKERC, 
2007:52). The rebound effect however can be counteracted by an energy tax or an 
emissions tax, in fact it is assumed that the existence of a carbon price under the 
EUETS will hamper any rebound effect (ibid:9). 
Demand reductions have several positive impacts on ES. On an energy system 
level, less demand allows for larger safety margins of spare capacity, which 
reduces the vulnerability of the energy system to sudden and extreme events 
(Checchi et al., 2009:37). Gas and electricity infrastructure gain increased 
reliability if they operate with larger safety margins, both the transmission and the 
generation parts. Demand reduction also has a positive effect on availability, 
especially of finite energy sources (fossil fuels, nuclear), as each finite energy 
source lasts longer when it is consumed more slowly. It also has a positive effect 
on accessibility, as demand reduction can alleviate import dependence for energy 
sources (Furman et al., 2007:10, Selvakkumaran&Limmeechokchai, 2013:498). In 
the European context however demand reductions from EE improvements have 
historically been outweighed by the depletion rate of domestic fossil fuel 
resources, so that although overall demand had been reduced, a larger part of the 
remaining demand had to be satisfied through energy imports so that energy 
dependence actually increased (Checchi et al., 2009:38). However without the 
demand reductions, energy dependence would have been even higher. 
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5.6 Which Causal Mechanism? 
Now that each abatement option and its impact on ES has been described in detail, 
it is possible to assess which causal mechanism is at work. Figure 10 depicts the 
causal pathways. Let’s recall from chapter three that source institution, target 
institution and unidirectional causal pathway must be identified in order to 
establish a case of institutional interaction. Source and target institutions (EUETS 
and EES) have already been identified in section 3.1.5. Let’s also recall that the 
causal pathway is defined by Oberthür&Gehring as “[...]a set of statements that 
are logically connected and provide a plausible account of how a given cause 
creates an observed effect.”. Each abatement option that operators have should be 
viewed as a separate causal pathway and thus as a separate case of institutional 
interaction.  
I argue that each case of institutional interaction between the two institutions 
should be categorized as behavioral interaction. Behavioral interaction posits that 
the behavior of actors induced by the source institution not only impacts the 
ultimate goal of governance of the source institution (i.e. climate mitigation), but 
also, inadvertently or not, influences the target institution, in our case EES. First 
 
 
Figure 10. Behavioral interaction in the case of the EUETS. 
Source: Own adaptation based on Oberthür & Gehring (2006:33) 
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the source institution’s output, the carbon market, influences the operators to 
reduce their emissions collectively by the amount specified in the cap (European 
Commission, 2013c). The concrete steps that operators take to reduce emissions 
fall into one of the five abatement categories developed by the IPCC and used in 
this thesis. By taking concrete steps to reduce emissions, operators (i.e. actors) 
transform policy output (rules, guidelines, constraints etc.) into outcome. The 
summary in figure 11 shows that each of the analyzed abatement options also has 
some potential impact on at least some of the sub-concepts of EES (i.e. 
availability, accessibility and reliability). Even in those cases where the effect on 
ES is considered indeterminate, there is an effect on the target institution, only 
that it cannot be determined whether the effect is beneficial or detrimental for the 
ultimate target of governance of the target institution (EES).  
In behavioral interaction, behavioral changes by actors (outcome) influence 
the performance and effectiveness of the target institution in some way 
(Oberthür&Gehring, 2006:40). The analyses of the different abatement categories 
in this chapter have shown that it is the behavior of the actors, their choice of how 
to abate emissions, that determines the resulting impact on EES. I therefore 
identify the causal mechanism present in each case of institutional interaction to 
be behavioral interaction, because it is what operators choose to do in order to 
meet the demands of the EUETS and abate that determines the impact on energy 
security. 
 
 
 Figure 11. Summary of abatement categories’ potential impacts on EES. 
 Abatement 
Category 
Availability Accessibility Reliability 
Natural Gas indeterminate trade-off indeterminate 
RES positive positive short-term trade-
off, long-term 
positive 
Nuclear short-term 
indeterminate, 
long-term positive 
positive positive 
CCS trade-off/ positive indeterminate indeterminate 
Efficiency positive positive positive 
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6 Conclusion 
This chapter summarizes the main results of this study, shows how the research 
question has been answered, and reflects upon the meaning and implications of 
the results. This study attempted to answer the following research question: 
 
How does the EUETS potentially affect European energy security? 
 
Sub-question: How do the different abatement options available to operators 
under the EUETS potentially influence European energy security?  
 
Without repeating too much of the results already presented in the analysis 
chapter, it can be stated here that the EUETS does potentially affect EES, and that 
the effects depend on how operators choose to abate their emissions. One way of 
answering the research question would be to say that the EUETS affects EES 
through behavioral interaction. However, given the importance of the policy goals 
of increasing energy security in Europe and at the same time reducing GHG 
emissions in order to prevent catastrophic climate change, the analytical insight 
that it is indeed the behavior of the operators under the EUETS that determines 
what kind of impact it will have on EES, appears somewhat peripheral. 
Institutional interaction theory is a valuable aid for understanding how the 
influence of the EUETS on EES works, but it focuses attention on the question of 
how to change the behavior of the operators, when the more important question 
that is not sufficiently answered is what kind of behavior is necessary in order to 
increase energy security and reduce emissions at the same time. 
This is why the sub-question needed to be answered. Knowing how the 
abatement options potentially affect EES, makes it possible to also consider ES-
impacts when choosing how to abate. These results are summarized in figure 11.  
It tells us that some of the abatement options analyzed clearly have a more 
positive impact on EES than others. But does knowing this fact change anything? 
From the institutional interaction analysis we also know that it is the behavior of 
the actors that creates the impact on the target institution. But will the actors 
change their behavior so as to increase EES simply because they are aware of the 
impact? It appears that the operators under the EUETS have the freedom to 
choose whatever abatement option they see fitting, but at the same time they are 
faced with an economic incentive structure through the carbon price that treats all 
abatement options equal. Shall we really expect operators to switch to a more 
EES-friendly alternative to reduce their emissions, when it is more expensive than 
pursuing a less EES-friendly alternative (e.g. gas)? Probably not if we also expect 
them to be rational economic actors. The polluter-pays-principle states that the 
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polluter should pay for pollution prevention and for remedying the environmental 
degradation caused by it (Woerdman et al, 2008:572). Who should carry the cost 
of providing energy security to Europe? If we consider ES a positive externality, 
operators will always under-provide it unless policy corrects the market failure. 
Could such policy be reconciled with the EUETS? Can the EUETS be adapted to 
also promote ES at the same time as promoting climate mitigation? Or would a 
separate ES-policy be more effective in promoting it? This would be a good 
research question for a future study.  
However before any corrective policy that supports EES can be introduced, 
we need to know how big the impact of the EUETS on EES is in reality. It is 
therefore paramount that governments start collecting and publishing data on the 
abatement behavior of operators. Once this data is published, a quantitative 
energy security analysis of actual abatement behavior of operators would need to 
be performed in order to determine if and how much corrective policy action is 
necessary to improve EES.  
In a way this study was also a failure. As has been mentioned in the 
introduction and also in the method chapter, the reason why I conducted a single 
case study is because I consider the case a very important question for the future 
of Europe. I accepted not being able to generalize the findings beyond the context 
of that case, and I also accepted conducting a study with only a theory-consuming 
approach, even though theories concerning the interaction of policies and theories 
concerning ES are both in an early conceptual stage and in need of development. I 
accepted all of these shortcomings because I wanted to be able to say something 
important about the relationship between the EUETS and EES. The results of this 
study point to the fact that some climate mitigation options are problematic for 
EES while others are beneficial. The effect is thus mixed. However because I 
could not study the actual abatement behavior of operators, I was forced to add 
the caveat that it is not the actual effect of the EUETS on EES that is mixed, but 
only the potential effect. I have thus not developed theory, not generalized any 
findings beyond the context of the case, but also not said anything definitive about 
the case itself, only that there are potential contradictions between the EUETS and 
EES. For the gravity of these contradictions to be assessed, to know whether the 
EUETS needs to be adapted to also promote EES or not, further research is 
required. 
While it may be a little bit troubling that in times of increased tensions with 
some of our biggest energy suppliers the EU does not have an energy security 
policy, and that it does not optimize the impact of the EUETS on ES, we can take 
comfort in the fact that options such as energy efficiency improvements, switch to 
RES or switch to nuclear exist, which allow the achievement of both ES and 
climate mitigation, and that they only wait to be implemented through effective 
policy. 
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7 Executive Summary 
7.1 Introduction 
Energy security and climate change are both important policy concerns in the 
European Union. Climate change is caused by the release of GHG into the 
atmosphere, which the EU seeks to reduce through its most important climate 
policy tool, the European Emissions Trading System (EUETS, European 
Commission, 2013e:2-4). It covers some 11 000 large industrial installations and 
power plants which produce about 45% of all European GHG emissions (ibid). 
Energy security has gradually become a concern for the EU, because of the high 
energy prices which persisted since the Iraq war in 2003, and the EU’s high 
import dependence in energy (52,7% of all energy consumed, Eurostat, 2012:29), 
especially in oil (84,3% import dependence, Eurostat, 2012:33) and gas (62,4% 
import dependence, ibid:35). The link between the EUETS and energy security 
are fossil fuels. The combustion of fossil fuels stands for 77% of all anthropogenic 
GHG emissions (IPCC, 2007:103) and at the same time the EU is highly 
dependent on fossil fuel imports and is therefore vulnerable to price swings and 
supply disruptions. Since the EUETS forces the installations it covers to reduce 
GHG emissions, and most of these emissions come from fossil fuels which are 
problematic for European energy security we assume that the operation of the 
EUETS has an impact on EES. Policy experts and researchers disagree about the 
benefits of climate policies for energy security, however no dedicated study of the 
specific energy security impacts of the EUETS has to date been published. I 
therefore suggest the following research question and sub question: 
 
How does the EUETS potentially affect European energy security? 
 
How do the different abatement options available to operators under the EUETS 
potentially influence European energy security? 
 
In order to answer the research question I conduct an exploratory qualitative case 
study, where the potential impacts of the EUETS on EES are treated as a case of 
institutional interaction. I investigate potential rather than actual effects, because 
data availability on actual abatement behavior by operators is poor. Abatement 
options are specifically included in the sub question, because abatement has been 
identified as the aspect of the EUETS from which influence on EES most likely 
originates. 
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7.2 Policy Context 
The development, theory and functioning in practice of the EUETS as well as an 
overview of the ES situation and policy in place in the EU are important for 
understanding the analysis of potential institutional interaction between the two 
fields. The EUETS belongs to a category of policy instruments called “market-
based instruments” that use price or some other economic variable to incentivize 
polluters/economic agents to abate pollution, and thus internalize an externality 
(Asafu-Adjaye, 2005:86; Saunier & Meganck, 2007:185). It is part of a broader 
package, the so-called “climate and energy package” that passed into law in 2009. 
The EUETS introduces a limit, a cap, on the maximum amount of GHG that can 
be emitted and issues permits for the amount of GHG that can be safely emitted, 
which operators must buy if their installations want to emit. The EUETS promises 
to reduce emissions at the lowest possible cost thanks to efficient allocation by 
market mechanisms. It also provides flexibility to individual installations, which 
can decide individually whether to reduce emissions (abate) or rather buy permits 
and emit. The problem with emissions abatement under the EUETS is that even 
though it is the desired outcome of the policy, no data is collected in a systematic 
fashion (Martin et al., 2012:43). Without such data we cannot know what the 
impact of these abatement activities is on EES. We therefore must turn to the 
IPCC, which developed categories of climate mitigation options into which efforts 
by operators in the energy and industrial sectors, i.e. the sectors covered by the 
EUETS, can be grouped. Rather than subjecting the actual abatement activities of 
EUETS operators to an ES analysis, I assess the ES impacts of the five abatement 
categories put forward by the IPCC. Operators must potentially choose some 
combination of them in order to reduce emissions, therefore it is a second-best 
alternative to analyze them. 
Energy policy, of which energy security is generally considered a part, is best 
characterized by its absence from the EU policy realm for the longest period of 
the EU’s existence. Article 194 TFEU in the Lisbon treaty (EU, 2010) marks the 
first time, that an enabling provision on energy policy is part of the treaties. In 
article 194 energy security is also stated as a policy goal. However the effective 
use of Art. 194 TFEU as a legal basis is hampered by a derogation from the 
ordinary legislative procedure, which effectively allows a national veto (Art. 
194§2 TFEU, EU, 2010). Instead of a dedicated energy policy, the EU pursues 
energy policy goals through the backdoors of internal market policy and 
environment policy, in which it holds considerably more competences than in 
energy policy. The missing EU competence in this field explains the relatively 
modest progress in EU energy security initiatives, and this despite the fact that 
energy security is a pressing problem for the EU and that energy is an almost 
natural field for European integration because of its cross-border character. 
  53 
7.3 Theory 
The theoretical framework of institutional interaction (Oberthür & Gehring, 2006) 
is operationalized in order to conceptualize how one policy such as the EUETS 
may influence another policy (or policy goal) such as EES. Secondly, the concept 
of energy security is discussed and an operational definition of ES is proposed, 
with the help of which an ES analysis of the five abatement options can then be 
performed. Institutional interaction refers to a causal relationship between two 
institutions, where the source institution exerts influence on the target institution, 
thus affecting the institutional development and effectiveness (performance) of 
the target institution. It is defined as one single unidirectional relationship that 
runs from source institution to target institution. This relationship can take the 
form of cognitive interaction, interaction through commitment, behavioral 
interaction and impact-level interaction. The impact on the target institution is 
constitutive of institutional interaction, without it there is no case of interaction. It 
is assessed compared to the policy direction of the target institution, i.e. the 
direction of collectively desired change, and can be categorized into positive 
effect, indeterminate effect and trade-off. 
Energy security is both a policy goal and an analytical category. Energy 
security in this thesis is defined to depend on the availability, accessibility and 
reliability of energy supplies. The concepts of economic efficiency (i.e. price 
security) and sustainability (i.e. environmental security), which are sometimes 
included in definitions of energy security are consciously excluded for reasons of 
analytical clarity and problems with double-counting. Availability refers to the 
amount of a given energy source that is available to a given consumer, 
accessibility refers to the geographic location of the resource and the related 
challenges to accessing it, while reliability refers to the risk of sudden supply 
disruptions. 
 
7.4 Method 
The research paradigm of this study is scientific realism. Scientific realism posits 
that knowledge can be gained by observing generative mechanisms in action 
(Pawson&Tilley, 1997:57). This study uses theory largely in a deductive, theory-
consuming fashion. The theoretical framework of institutional interaction is used 
to help explain what kind of relationship exists between the EUETS and EES. The 
research design of this thesis is a single case study design, utilizing qualitative 
data from a literature review. It is used because case studies are well-suited to 
explore the existence of causal relationships and to give rich descriptions of their 
nature. It is a qualitative case study because the information necessary to answer 
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the research question is mainly available in the form of qualitative data, but 
“qualitative” in this study does not denote the whole package44 of methodological 
choices often assumed to accompany qualitative research. The data collection 
method chosen for this study is a literature review method. The purpose of 
employing the literature review method in this study is not to give a general 
overview of the literature, but to elicit from the large number of existing reports, 
papers and other publications on ES and on climate mitigation, cues about how 
the EUETS may influence EES. The sources for the literature review are peer-
reviewed academic journals, grey literature as well as research anthologies and 
university textbooks. Grey literature denotes reports, working papers, policy 
summaries, analyses etc. from a range of organizations such as international 
organizations, government agencies, policy research consultancies as well as think 
tanks and industry associations. Guiding questions were used in order to select 
relevant passages from the material surveyed. Selection bias cannot be completely 
avoided because of the non-probabilistic sampling of material, but at the same 
time weighs less heavily because of less far-reaching conclusions and 
generalizations drawn from the material. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
44 The “qualitative research package” is often said to consist of an inductive or grounded theory approach to 
theory, an interpretivist epistemological position, and a constructionist ontological position (cf. Bryman, 
2008:366, 593). This combination is common but not binding (ibid:23, 593) 
  55 
7.5 Analysis and Conclusion 
In the analysis chapter, each respective abatement category is analyzed for a) how 
it achieves climate mitigation, how it works and b) how it impacts on each of the 
sub-concepts of energy security. The analysis is carried out on data collected in a 
literature review in a textual fashion. It is filled with important details and 
reasoning and therefore difficult to summarize. The reader is strongly advised to 
read the actual analysis chapter and not only the summary table, since it is 
otherwise impossible to understand how the results were arrived at. The results of 
the analysis are summarized in the following table. 
 
 Figure 12. Summary of abatement categories’ potential impacts on EES. 
 
Abatement 
Category 
Availability Accessibility Reliability 
Natural 
Gas indeterminate trade-off indeterminate 
RES 
positive positive 
short-term 
trade-off, 
long-term 
positive 
Nuclear short-term 
indeterminate, 
long-term 
positive 
positive positive 
CCS trade-off/ 
positive indeterminate indeterminate 
Efficiency 
positive positive positive 
 
The analysis also argues that each case of institutional interaction between the two 
institutions should be categorized as behavioral interaction. Behavioral interaction 
posits that the behavior of actors (i.e. the operators), induced by the source 
institution (the EUETS), influences the target institution, in our case EES.  
The study concludes that the EUETS does potentially affect EES, and that the 
effects depend on how operators choose to abate their emissions. The way this 
effect takes place is through behavioral interaction, and the type of impact varies 
considerably for each mitigation option. The study also concludes, that data on 
abatement needs to be published so that researchers can conduct a quantitative 
study to determine the actual rather than only the potential impact of the EUETS 
on European energy security. 
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